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MARTIN-LO¨F COMPLEXES
S. AWODEY, P. HOFSTRA, AND M. A. WARREN
Dedicated to Per Martin-Lo¨f on the occasion of his retirement.
Abstract. In this paper we define Martin-Lo¨f complexes to be algebras for
monads on the category of (reflexive) globular sets which freely add cells in
accordance with the rules of intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory. We then
study the resulting categories of algebras for several theories. Our principal
result is that there exists a cofibrantly generated Quillen model structure on
the category of 1-truncated Martin-Lo¨f complexes and that this category is
Quillen equivalent to the category of groupoids. In particular, 1-truncated
Martin-Lo¨f complexes are a model of homotopy 1-types.
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1. Introduction
This paper pursues a surprising connection between Geometry, Algebra, and
Logic that has only recently come to light, in the form of an interpretation of
the constructive type theory of Martin-Lo¨f into homotopy theory, resulting in new
examples of certain algebraic structures which are important in topology. This
fascinating connection is currently under investigation from several different per-
spectives ([1, 21, 6, 14, 4, 5] ), and these preliminary results confirm the significance
of the link. Some of these results will be surveyed in this brief introduction in order
to position the present work in its context; especially for the reader coming from
one field or the other, a brief summary is given of the essential concepts from the
different subjects involved.
Martin-Lo¨f type theory [15] is a formal system originally intended to provide
a rigorous framework in which to develop constructive mathematics. At heart,
it is a calculus for reasoning about dependent types and terms, and equality be-
tween those. Under the Curry-Howard correspondence, one may identify types
with propositions, and terms with proofs. Viewed in this manner, the system
can be shown to be at least as strong as second-order logic, and it is also known
to interpret constructive set theory. Indeed, Martin-Lo¨f type theory has been used
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successfully to formalize parts of constructive mathematics, such as pointless topol-
ogy (constructive locale theory). Moreover, it has been employed as a framework
for the development of programming languages as well, a task for which it is espe-
cially well-suited in virtue of its combination of expressive strength and desirable
proof-theoretic properties. (See the textbook [16] for a discussion.)
The type theory has two variants: an intensional, and an extensional version.
The difference between them lies mainly in the treatment of equality. In the inten-
sional version (with which we are mainly concerned in the present work), one has
two different kinds of equality: the first kind is called definitional equality, and
behaves much like equality between terms in the simply-typed lambda-calculus, or
any other conventional equational theory. The second kind is a more subtle relation,
called propositional equality, which, under the Curry-Howard correspondence,
represents the equality formulas of first-order logic. Specifically, given two terms
a, b of the same type A, one may form a new type IdA(a, b), which we think of as
the proposition that a and b are equal; a term of this type thus represents a proof
of the proposition that a equals b (hence the name “propositional equality”).
When a and b are definitionally equal, then (since they can be freely substi-
tuted for each other) they are also propositionally equal, in the sense that the type
IdA(a, b) is inhabited by a term; but the converse is generally not true, at least
in the intensional version of the theory. In the extensional version, by contrast,
the two notions of equality are forced by an additional rule to coincide. As is
well-known, however, the price one pays for this simplification is a loss of desirable
proof-theoretic properties, such as strong normalization and decidable equality of
terms.
In the intensional version with which we shall be concerned here, it can be
shown that the identity types IdA(a, b) carry certain structure which was observed
by Hofmann and Streicher in [8] to be analogous to that of a groupoid. Specifically,
the reflexivity of propositional equality produces identity proofs r(a) : IdA(a, a) for
any term a : A, playing the role of a unit arrow for a; and when f : IdA(a, b) is an
identity proof, then (corresponding to the symmetry of identity) there also exists a
proof f−1 : IdA(b, a), to be thought of as the inverse of f ; finally, when f : IdA(a, b)
and g : IdA(b, c) are identity proofs, then (corresponding to transitivity) there is
a new proof (g · f) : IdA(a, c), thought of as the composite of f and g. Moreover,
this structure on each type A can be shown to satisfy the usual groupoid laws, but
only up to propositional equality. We shall return to this point below.
1.1. Groupoid semantics. A good notion of a model for the extensional theory
is due to Seely [18], who showed that one can interpret type dependency in locally
cartesian closed categories in a very natural way. (There are certain coherence
issues related to this semantics, prompting a later refinement, but this need not
concern us here.) Of course, intensional type theory may also be interpreted this
way in lcccs, but then the interpretation of the identity types necessarily becomes
trivial.
The first non-trivial semantics for intensional type theory was developed by
Hofmann and Streicher [8] using groupoids, which are categories in which every
arrow is an isomorphism. The category of groupoids is not locally cartesian closed,
and the model employs certain fibrations (equivalently, groupoid-valued functors)
to model type dependency. A closed type A will be interpreted as a groupoid, a term
a : A as an object of this groupoid, and an identity proof f : IdA(a, b) as an arrow
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f : a → b in G. The interpretation no longer validates extensionality, since there
can be different elements a, b related by non-identity arrows f : a→ b. Indeed, there
may be many different such arrows f, g, · · · : a → b ; however, unlike in the type
theory, these cannot in turn be further related by non-trivial identity terms of higher
type ϑ : IdIdA(f, g), since a (conventional) groupoid has no non-trivial higher-
dimensional structure. Thus the groupoid semantics validates a certain truncation
principle, stating that all higher identity types are trivial—a form of extensionality
one dimension up. In particular, the groupoid laws for the identity types are strictly
satisfied in these models, rather than holding only up to propositional equality.
This situation has led to the use of the higher-dimensional analogues of groupoids,
as formulated in category theory, in order to provide models admitting non-trivial
higher identity types. Such higher groupoids have been studied extensively in homo-
topy theory in recent years, since they occur naturally as the (higher) fundamental
groupoids of spaces (see below). In this direction, Warren [21] has generalized the
groupoid model of [8] to strict ω-groupoids, thereby showing that the type the-
ory truly possesses non-trivial higher-dimensional structure. Along similar lines,
Garner [6] has used a 2-dimensional notion of fibration to model intensional type
theory, and shown that when various truncation axioms are added the theory is
sound and complete with respect to this semantics.
1.2. Homotopy theory. In homotopy theory one is concerned with spaces and
continuous mappings up to homotopy; a homotopy between continuous maps f, g :
X → Y is a continuous map ϑ : X × [0, 1] → Y satisfying ϑ(x, 0) = f(x) and
ϑ(x, 1) = g(x). Such a homotopy ϑ can be thought of as a “continuous deforma-
tion” of f into g, determining a higher-dimensional arrow ϑ : f → g. As already
suggested, one also considers homotopies between homotopies, referred to as higher
homotopies. Algebraic invariants, such as homology or the fundamental group, are
homotopy-invariant: they are invariants of the homotopy types of spaces, i.e. of
equivalence classes of spaces under the homotopy equivalence relation, where two
spaces X and Y are said to be homotopy equivalent if there exist maps f : X → Y
and g : Y → X for which the composites gf and fg are homotopic to the identity
maps on X and on Y , respectively.
When we consider the points of a space X , the paths in X , the homotopies
between paths, and all higher homotopies, we obtain a structure called the funda-
mental weak ω-groupoid of X . We can truncate this structure by considering
only the points and paths up to homotopy, and this yields the usual fundamental
groupoid of the space. This truncation is evidently analogous to adding to our type
theory axioms of extensionality above the first identity type. Indeed, these con-
structions, including the basic assignment of fundamental groupoids to objects, are
special cases of a common, general construction that can be described abstractly
in axiomatic homotopy theory. The central concept is that of a Quillen model
category, which captures axiomatically some of the essential features of homo-
topy of topological spaces, enabling us to “do homotopy” in different mathematical
settings, and to express the fact that two categories carry the same homotopical
information, even if they are not equivalent in the ordinary sense. The basic re-
sult of Awodey and Warren in [1] (see also [21]) is that it is possible to model the
type theory in any Quillen model category which is well-behaved in certain ways
(essentially using just the basic notion of a weak factorization system). In this
interpretation, one uses path objects to model identity types in a non-trivial way,
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recovering the groupoid model as a special case. This suggests that intensional
type theories are a sort of internal language of (certain kinds of) model categories.
Indeed, in [5] it is shown that the type theory itself carries a natural such homotopy
structure (i.e. a weak factorization system), so that the theory is not only sound
but also complete with respect to such abstract homotopical semantics.
Thus we are justified in thinking of types in the intensional theory as spaces.
From this point of view, the terms of the type A are the points of the “space” A, the
identity type IdA(a, b) represents the collection of paths from a to b, and the higher
identities are homotopies between paths, homotopies between homotopies of paths,
et cetera. The fact that paths and homotopies do not form a groupoid, but only
a groupoid up to homotopy, is of course precisely the same observation as the fact
that the identity types only satisfy the groupoid laws up to propositional equality.
This parallel between type theory and homotopy theory, which was first pointed
out by Moerdijk a few years ago, has now been made precise by the recognition
that both cases are instances of one and the same abstract axiomatic theory.
In particular, it has been shown independently by Lumsdaine [14] and Van den
Berg and Garner [4] that the tower of identity types over any fixed base type A in
the intensional theory indeed gives rise to a certain infinite dimensional categori-
cal structure called a weak ω-groupoid. In fact, something apparently stronger is
shown, namely that at every type the type theory already hosts an internal model
of such a higher category. The next step in exploring the connection between type
theory and topology is to investigate the relationship between type theoretic “trun-
cation” (i.e. higher-dimensional extensionality principles) and topological “trunca-
tion” of the higher fundamental groups. Spaces for which the homotopy type is
already completely determined by the fundamental groupoid are called homotopy
1-types, or simply 1-types. More generally, one has n-types, which are thought
of as spaces which have no homotopical information above dimension n. One of
the goals of homotopy theory is to obtain good models of homotopy n-types. For
example, the category of groupoids is Quillen equivalent to the category of 1-types
and therefore the corresponding homotopy categories (obtained by inverting weak
equivalences) are equivalent; in this precise sense, groupoids are said to model ho-
motopy 1-types (for more on homotopy types see [3]).
1.3. Contributions of this paper. The current paper aims at further investiga-
tion of the relationship between type theory and homotopy theory, but in a way
that is somewhat different from the work already mentioned. First of all, our pri-
mary objective is not to give a new semantics, although some of the results will
depend on a new model which will be presented in a sequel to this paper. Secondly,
while earlier work centered around constructing higher-dimensional structures from
type theories, we are also interested in understanding the limitations of this pro-
cess. Finally, we wish to make another connection between model categories and
type theory, namely by showing that a category of suitably truncated type theories
gives a model of the homotopy 1-types. It is our hope that this picture can then
be extended to higher dimensions.
Our first goal is to show how every extension of intensional type theory gives rise
to a monad on the category of globular sets. Intuitively, the monad associated to a
theory freely adds cells to a globular set in accordance with the structure imposed
on the tower of identity types over a base type by the rules of the type theory.
For example, the monad will formally add composites and inverses for all cells of
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dimension strictly greater than 0 in the globular set; however, it adds much more
than just these formal composites; it also produces a plethora of new cells which
we here call doppelga¨ngers. For every such monad we may consider its category
of algebras: these we refer to as Martin-Lo¨f complexes (or ML-complexes),
and these are the main objects of study of the paper.
The theories which we shall consider arise from basic intensional Martin-Lo¨f type
theory having dependent sums and products as well as a natural numbers object.
(The latter plays no conceptual role in this paper but because of its importance in
virtually every application of the theory to mathematics and computer science we
thought it important to show that our results are not affected by its presence.) We
shall then consider extensions of this basic theory obtained by adding truncation
axioms, which effectively trivialize the higher identity types above a fixed dimension.
Using these theories we get a hierarchy of categories of Martin-Lo¨f complexes, and
in this paper we shall investigate the first two dimensions in detail.
The 0-dimensional case is relatively straightforward — we shall prove here that
the monad on globular sets is idempotent and is in fact isomorphic to the con-
nected components functor, so that its category of algebras (the 0-dimensional
ML-complexes) is equivalent to the category of sets.
Matters become more interesting in dimension 1. Towards an analysis of 1-
dimensional ML-complexes we first observe, using the Hofmann-Streicher groupoid
semantics, that every ML-complex has an underlying groupoid, and that there is
a canonical comparison functor between the underlying groupoid of a free ML-
complex and the free groupoid on the same globular set. This functor is not an
isomorphism of groupoids, because the free ML-complex is, intuitively speaking,
much larger due to all the doppelga¨ngers produced by the theory. The main tech-
nical difficulty then is to prove that there is still an equivalence of groupoids be-
tween the two. This result follows from a proof-theoretic analysis of the theories
in question, which will be borrowed from [9]. One of the main results in loc. cit.
allows us to conclude that every term of the theory represents, up to propositional
equality, an object or morphism of the free groupoid. This essentially shows that
even though the theory forces the existence of many more objects and arrows than
needed to form the free groupoid, it does not force anything which is undesirable
from a homotopical point of view.
Once this key result is in place, we turn to an analysis of the category of 1-
dimensional ML-complexes as a whole. To start, we set up an adjunction between
this category and the category of groupoids. This adjunction is not an equivalence:
a ML-complex structure on a globular set carries essentially more information than
a groupoid structure. We can, however, make use of the adjunction by transferring
along it the standard Quillen model structure on the category of groupoids [11],
turning the category of 1-dimensional ML-complexes into a cofibrantly generated
model category.
Finally, we prove that the adjunction between groupoids and 1-dimensional ML-
complexes is in fact a Quillen equivalence. Because the categories of groupoids
and that of homotopy 1-types are Quillen equivalent, this makes precise in which
sense the 1-truncated version of the type theory models homotopy 1-types. It
also explains why the groupoid semantics is adequate from a homotopical point of
view, but is still incomplete because it lacks the possibility (which is present in
ML-complexes) of handling different interpretations for doppelga¨nger terms.
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1.4. Plan of the paper. In Section 2 we recall the basics of Martin-Lo¨f type
theory as well as several facts about globular sets which will be required later. We
also fix notation (some of which is non-standard). The reader who is familiar with
this material should feel free to skip ahead.
Section 3 describes the construction of monads on the category of reflexive glob-
ular sets coming from type theories. We then define the categories MLCx and
MLCxn of Martin-Lo¨f complexes and n-truncated Martin-Lo¨f complexes as the
Eilenberg-Moore categories of the monads Mω and Mn, respectively, generated by
suitable theories. These monads are shown to be finitary and it therefore follows
that the categories MLCx and MLCxn are complete and cocomplete.
In Section 4 we study 0-truncated and 1-truncated Martin-Lo¨f complexes. We
first show that the category MLCx0 is equivalent to the category of sets and,
moreover, that if X is a reflexive globular set, then M0(X) is the set of connected
components ofX . Even the proofs of these eminently plausible results are a bit more
complicated than one might at first expect; one of the principal difficulties one faces
when proving results about Martin-Lo¨f complexes is that the type theory also adds,
in addition to composition and inverses, the doppelga¨nger terms mentioned earlier.
We then turn to 1-truncated complexes, with a proof that every such complex
can be equipped with the structure of a groupoid. Towards a characterization of
the free 1-dimensional ML-complexes, it is first shown that the Hofmann-Streicher
groupoid semantics induces a comparison functor between the free groupoid F(G)
on a reflexive globular set and the induced groupoid structure on M1(G), the free
1-dimensional algebra on G. The main technical observation, namely that this
comparison functor is an equivalence of groupoids, follows from the realizability
semantics presented in [9]. Because this technique will also be required later, we
shall give, for reasons of self-containment of the present paper, a brief explanation
of how it works.
Finally, Section 5 shows that MLCx1 can be endowed with a Quillen closed
model structure. This model structure is obtained from an adjunction with the
category of groupoids via Quillen’s path object argument [17]. The main result
states that the adjunction between MLCx1 and the category of groupoids is a
Quillen equivalence (Theorem 5.10). Both the existence of the model structure
and the verification of the Quillen equivalence make crucial use of the realizability
semantics from [9].
Acknowledgements. We are greatly indebted to the anonymous referee for pro-
viding us with numerous insightful comments and suggestions and for pointing out,
as Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine also did, a gap in an earlier version of this paper. We
would also like to thank Nicola Gambino, Richard Garner, Peter LeFanu Lums-
daine, Thomas Streicher and Phil Scott for useful discussions of some of the ideas
in this paper.
2. Background
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a brief introduction to
Martin-Lo¨f type theory. We begin by giving a quick exposition of the main features
of the most basic version of the theory we shall be concerned with. In particular
we explain the different kinds of judgements of the system, dependent products
and sums, identity types and the notion of propositional equality. We also use this
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as an opportunity to fix some notation and terminology, in particular concerning
identity types.
We assume that the reader is somewhat familiar with at least simple type theory.
For more background on (dependent) type theory we refer to the textbook [10]. The
reader who is more familiar with higher-dimensional category theory or homotopy
theory might also consult [1] for a “homotopical” view of type theory.
In the last subsection we introduce the basic categorical structures used in the
paper, namely globular sets. A more detailed exposition of globular sets may be
found in [19], or the textbook [13].
2.1. Type dependency, contexts and judgements. Type dependency means
that types may depend on variables of other types; for example one can has a type
T (x) depending on a variable x of type S. Such a type T (x) is often thought of as
being indexed by the type S. To illustrate this, suppose that we let S denote the
type of rings; then the type T (x) of modules depends on, or varies over, the type
of rings.
One may then substitute a term a of type S into the type T (x), as to obtain a
new type T (a). In the above example, T (a) would be the type of modules over the
ring a.
The fact that types may depend on terms has two obvious consequences: first,
one can no longer, as in simple type theory, separate the formation of types and that
of terms into two inductive defitions; rather, types and terms are derived simulta-
neously. Second, the notion of a variable context also needs to take dependency
into account. Explicitly, this means that a variable context Γ is now an ordered
sequence of variable declarations Γ = (x1 : T1, . . . , xk : Tk), where each type Ti may
only depend on the variables declared earlier, i.e. on x1, . . . , xi−1. For example,
x : S, y : S, z : T (x), v : R(x, y, z)
is a legitimate variable context, but
x : S, y : s, v : R(x, y, z), z : T (x)
is not, because of the fact that R depends on z, which hasn’t been declared yet.
Throughout, we shall always assume that contexts are well-formed in this sense.
Thus the theory is concerned with types and terms in context, and with equal-
ities between such types and terms. Formally, statements about these are called
judgements, and these come in four kinds:
Γ ⊢ T : type
This judgement states that T is a type, possibly depending on the variables declared
in the context Γ.
Γ ⊢ τ : T
This judgement states that τ is a term of type T , where both τ and the type T
may depend on the variables from Γ.
Γ ⊢ T = S : type
This judgement states that T and S are (definitionally) equal types.
Γ ⊢ τ = τ ′ : T
This judgement states that τ and τ ′ are (definitionally) equal terms of type T .
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In the theory, such judgements are derived from axioms using inference rules.
These derivations (which may formally be regarded as finite trees suitably labelled
by judgements and inference rules) are the main objects of study. Below we shall
discuss several of the rules which may be used to derive new judgements from old;
the axioms typically include judgements stating the existence of certain basic types
and terms.
When the context plays no role in a judgement or rule of the theory, we shall
usually omit it altogether.
2.2. Definitional equality. The notion of equality here is the standard one, but
often the qualifier definitional is used to distinguish it from the different notion
of propositional equality, to be discussed below. The rules governing the behaviour
of definitional equality are as expected. Apart from the rules expressing that defi-
nitional equality is an equivalence relation, there are rules which force that it is a
congruence with respect to substitution into types and terms:
⊢ a = b : A x : A ⊢ B(x) : type
⊢ B(a) = B(b) : type
⊢ a = b : A x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
⊢ f(a) = f(b) : B(a)
⊢ A = B : type ⊢ a : A
⊢ a : B
The first rule states that substituting equal terms into a type results in equal types;
the second states the same, but now for substitution into terms; the last rule states
that equal types are inhabited by the same terms. A complete set of rules for
definitional equality may be found in the appendix.
2.3. Dependent products and sums. There are several ways to construct new
types from old. For each new type one specifies three things: an introduction
rule which generates new terms of the type; an elimination rule which shows how
general terms of the new type may be used; and a conversion rule which governs
the interaction between the two.
We now discuss the formation of dependent products and sums. Given a type
B(x) depending on a variable x of type A, we may form the type
∏
x:AB(x), to be
thought of as the type of sections of B(x) over A. The rules are as follows:
x : A ⊢ B(x) : type ∏
formation
⊢
∏
x:AB(x) : type
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x) ∏
introduction
⊢ λx:A.f(x) :
∏
x:AB(x)
⊢ f :
∏
x:AB(x) ⊢ a : A ∏ elimination
⊢ app(f, a) : B(a)
⊢ λx:A.f(x) :
∏
x:AB(x) ⊢ a : A ∏ conversion
⊢ app
(
λx:A.f(x), a
)
= f(a) : B(a)
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Thus an introduction term of type
∏
x:AB(x) is a lambda expression, thought of
as an operation assigning to each x : A a value f(x) : B(x). A general term f of
type
∏
x:AB(x) may be applied to a term a of type A, as to return a term app(f, a)
of type B(a). Finally, the conversion rule, commonly known as beta-conversion,
allows us to reduce app(λx:A.f(x), a) to f(a). In the case where the type B(x) does
not depend on the variable x, we shall often write BA for the type
∏
x:AB(x).
Similarly, the theory admits formation of dependent sum types
∑
x:AB(x).
The rules are:
x : A ⊢ B(x) : type ∑
formation
⊢
∑
x:AB(x) : type
⊢ a : A ⊢ b : B(a) ∑
introduction
⊢ pair(a, b) :
∑
x:AB(x)
⊢ p :
∑
x:AB(x) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ ψ(x, y) : C
(
pair(x, y)
) ∑
elimination
⊢ R
(
[x : A, y : B(x)]ψ(x, y), p
)
: C(p)
⊢ a : A ⊢ b : B(a) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ ψ(x, y) : C
(
pair(x, y)
) ∑
conversion
⊢ R
(
[x : A, y : B(x)]ψ(x, y), pair(a, b)
)
= ψ(a, b) : C
(
pair(a, b)
)
The notation [x : A, y : B(x)] indicates that the variables x and y are formally
bound in the term. Using these rules, we may define projection terms by letting
π0(p) = R([x : A, y : B(x)]x, p), π1(p) = R([x : A, y : B(x)]y : B(p)
in
⊢ p :
∑
x:AB(x) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ x : A ∑ elimination
⊢ π0(p) : A
⊢ p :
∑
x:AB(x) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ y : B(x) ∑ elimination
⊢ π1(p) : B(π0(p))
The projection terms π0(p) and π1(p) then satisfy the conversion rules
πi(pair(a, b)) =
{
a if i = 0
b if i = 1.
We point out that we do not adopt the η-rule for sums
⊢ p :
∑
x:AB(x)
⊢ p = pair(π0(p), π1(p)) :
∑
x:AB(x)
but that it can easily be proved that every term of type
∑
x:AB(x) is propositionally
equal to a pair term (see the discussion of identity types below for what this means).
In some treatments a different formulation of the rules for sum types is used,
taking the projection terms as primitive. In the presence of the η-rule both formu-
lations are equivalent, but without the η-rule this latter approach is strictly weaker
(see [7]).
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2.4. Identity types. Let A be a type. For every pair of terms a, b of type A we
may form a new type A(a, b). This type is thought of as the type of proofs of
the fact that a and b are equal. A term τ : A(a, b) is sometimes referred to as
a propositional identity proof. It is important to note that the existence of
such a proof term does not necessarily imply that a = b in the definitional sense of
equality discussed above. From a more geometric perspective one may think of a
propositional equality as a homotopy between a and b (see [1]). This explains why
we sometimes use the notation a ≃ b to indicate the existence of a propositional
identity between a and b. We also point out that it is perhaps more common
to denote the identity type A(a, b) by IdA(a, b), but we have chosen to adopt a
notation more suggestive of hom-sets.
The formation rule for the identity types is thus as follows (omitting contexts
for simplicity)
⊢ a, b : A
Id formation
⊢ A(a, b) : type
where we write a, b : A as an abreviation for the two judgements a : A and b : A.
Then, there are the introduction and elimination rules:
⊢ a : A
Id introduction
r(a) : A(a, a)
x : A, y : A, z : A(x, y) ⊢ B(x, y, z) : type
x : A ⊢ ϕ(x) : B
(
x, x, r(x)
)
⊢ f : A(a, b)
Id elimination
⊢ J[x,y:A,z:A(x,y)]B(x,y,z)
(
[x : A]ϕ(x), a, b, f) : B(a, b, f)
The introduction term r(a) is called the reflexivity term; it witnesses the fact that
a ≃ a. The elimination rule is a bit more involved. What we start with is first of all
a type A (which is referred to as the type over which the elimination occurs),
and an identity proof f : A(a, b) (this is the term which is being eliminated). Next
we need a type B(x, y, z) (called the pattern type) and a term ϕ(x) of type
B(x, x, r(x)) which intuitively witnesses the fact that the pattern type is inhabited
in the trivial instance where we substitute a reflexivity term. Given all of this, we
may form a new term J([x : A]ϕ(x), a, b, f) of type B(a, b, f). One way to think
of this J-term is as the result of expanding the term φ(x) using the propositional
equality f : A(a, b). This viewpoint will be developed in more detail later on.
Note also that the variables x, y, z in the elimination rule need not necessarily
occur in the type B(x, y, z), and similarly that x need not occur in ϕ(x). Also,
it may happen that the term f (and possibly also a, b) are themselves variable, in
which case the J-term depends on those variables.
Finally, there is a conversion rule:
⊢ a : A
Id conversion
⊢ J[x,y:A,z:A(x,y)]B(x,y,z)
(
[x : A]ϕ(x), a, a, r(a)
)
= ϕ(a) : B
(
a, a, r(a)
)
Thus, using a trivial identity proof r(a) to build a J-term does simply give back
ϕ(a).
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To illustrate the use of the rules for derivations of judgements, we give an example
of a derivation which shows that the result of applying a term to two propositionally
equal terms results in propositionally equal terms.
Example 2.1. Let τ ≃ τ ′ :
∏
v:S T (v), and let σ : S be derivable. Then app(τ, σ) ≃
app(τ ′, σ) is also derivable. Indeed, consider the following derivation:
x, y :
∏
v:S T (v), z :
∏
v:S T (v)(x, y) ⊢ T (σ)(app(x, σ), app(y, σ)) : type
x :
∏
v:S T (v) ⊢ r(app(x, σ)) : T (σ)(app(x, σ), app(x, σ))
⊢ f :
∏
v:S T (v)(τ, τ
′)
Id elim.
⊢ J
(
[x :
∏
v:S T (v)]r(app(x, σ)), τ, τ
′, f) : T (σ)(app(τ, σ), app(τ ′, σ))
Here, f is a term witnessing the propositional identity τ ≃ τ ′. Of course, the two
other premises have to be derived as well, but this is straightforward.
Similarly we may derive from σ ≃ σ′ that app(τ, σ) ≃ app(τ, σ′).
2.5. Natural numbers. So far we have discussed only methods to construct new
types and terms from ones already present. It is common to introduce as a basic
type the type N of natural numbers, and to add axioms
N introduction (i)
0 : N
n : N
N introduction (ii)
S(n) : N
which allow us to construct the standard numerals. Since the type of natural
numbers will not play a central role in this paper we refer to the appendix for the
precise formulation of the elimination rule (expressing the possibility of defining
terms by recursion) and the conversion rules. We do point out however that aside
from the standard numerals the theory may prove the existence of other, non-
standard, numerals as well.
2.6. Theories and extensions. We shall denote by Tω the system having all of
the above constructors and rules, including those for the type of natural numbers
(for a complete description see the appendix). By a type theory we shall mean
any extension of the basic system Tω obtained by adding axioms and possibly also
inference rules. The axioms are judgements which may assert the existence of basic
types or terms, or may assert the equality between certain types or terms. Possible
additional inference rules include the so-called truncation- and reflection rules,
which express triviality of certain identity types. See Section 3 for a discussion of
these rules.
Given two type theories T and T′, we say that T′ is an extension of T when
every judgement which is derivable in T is also derivable in T′. Notation: T ⊆ T′.
Thus by our definitions, Tω is the smallest type theory.
2.7. Expressions. Because the types and terms of such theories are defined simul-
taneously, in order to formally specify the syntax of the theory it is convenient to
first define inductively a class of expressions — which need not satisfy any typing
conventions — from which the genuine syntactical data of the theory is then ex-
tracted via the rules given above (and stated in full in Appendix A). For example,
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in order to formally define the theory Tω we first fix a countable set V of (untyped)
variables and then define the class of expressions of Tω, denoted Exp(Tω), by
• v is in Exp(Tω), for any v in V ;
• 0 and N are in Exp(Tω);
• S(p), app(p, q), pair(p, q), r(p), rec(p, q, r), R(p, q), J(p, q, r, s) and λp:q .r are
in Exp(Tω) when p, q, r and s are;
• p(q, r),
∏
p:q r and
∑
p:q r are in Exp(Tω) when p, q and r are.
Thus, the expressions are generated by applying all term- and type constructors
without regard for well-typedness. The derivation rules of the type theory may
then be regarded as carving out from this set of all expressions those which are
well-formed and well-typed. The syntax of other the theories extending Tω that
we consider later is similarly specified in this way with the evident modifications to
the definition of the expressions. Moreover, because the expressions are inductively
generated it follows that the sets of the form Exp(−) possess an obvious universal
property.
2.8. Context morphisms. Recall that if Γ and
∆ =
(
x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An(x1, . . . , xn−1)
)
are contexts, then a context morphism a : Γ→ ∆ is a sequence of terms
Γ ⊢ a1 : A1,Γ ⊢ a2 : A2(a1), . . . ,Γ ⊢ an : An(a1, . . . , an−1).
There is a category of contexts with arrows the context morphisms (cf. [7]).
2.9. Globular sets. Globular sets are structures which form the basis for several
definitions of higher dimensional category. One way to think of a globular set is
as a higher dimensional graph: not only are there vertices and edges between the
vertices, but one has edges between edges, and so on. Formally, a globular set G is
a tuple (Gn, sn, tn)n∈N, where each Gn is a set, and where sn, tn : Gn+1 → Gn are
functions subject to the globular identities
dndn+1 = dnsn+1; snsn+1 = sndn+1 (1)
for d = s, t. Elements of Gn are referred to as n-cells, and are said to have dimen-
sion n. The maps sn and tn are called source and target maps, respectively.
If G is a globular set for which Gn = ∅ for all n > 1, then we may simply
regard G as a (directed) graph. If there exist elements of higher dimension, then
the globular identities ensure that the source sn(x) and target tn(x) for such an
n-dimensional edge are a parallel pair of edges of dimension n− 1.
Because it is often convenient, given a n-cell α of a globular set G, to be able to
refer to the result of iteratively taking the source or target of α we introduce the
notation αj0, α
j
1 for these corresponding j-cells. Explicitly, for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
αji :=
{
sj ◦ · · · ◦ s(n−1)(α) if i = 0
tj ◦ · · · ◦ t(n−1)(α) if i = 1.
By the globular identities, αj0 and α
j
1 are the only elements of Gj which are obtain-
able from α by applying the source and target maps.
A globular set G is said to be reflexive if it comes equipped with a family of
maps in : Gn → Gn+1, such that
tnin = 1 = snin (2)
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We think of in(x) as the identity edge from x to itself. In this paper we shall
be working with reflexive globular sets only. For readability we often omit the
dimension from the source, target and identity maps of a globular set.
A morphism of globular sets f : G → H is a family of functions fn : Gn →
Hn which commute with the source and target maps. Globular sets and their
morphisms form a category denoted GSet. For reflexive globular sets we also
require that the fn commute with the identity maps; this gives a category rGSet.
There is a functor ∆ : Set→ rGSet which takes a set A to the constant globular
set with ∆(A)n = A. A globular set which is isomorphic to one of the form ∆(A)
will be called constant. The functor ∆ has a left adjoint π0 : rGSet→ Set; this
functor assigns to a globular set G its set of connected components
π0(G) = G0/∼
where the equivalence relation on 0-dimensional elements is generated by
x ∼ y ⇔ ∃f ∈ G1.s(f) = x, t(f) = y.
We may express this as a (reflexive) coequalizer diagram:
G1
s //
t
// G0 // // π0(G).
The composite ∆π0 : rGSet→ rGSet is an idempotent monad, to which we refer
as 0-truncation. Often it will be convenient to identify the essential image of this
functor (the constant globular sets) with the category of sets.
We may also truncate a globular set at dimension 1: in this case we replace
the category of sets by the category rGraph of directed reflexive graphs. There
is a functor rGSet→ rGraph which assigns to a globular set G the graph whose
vertex set is G0 and whose edge set is G1/ ∼, where two edges h, k satisfy h ∼ k if
there is an α ∈ G2 with s(α) = h, t(α) = k.
In the other direction, any directed reflexive graph G gives a globular set with
which is the same as G in dimensions 0 and 1, and is degenerate above dimension 1.
The composite functor rGSet→ rGraph → rGSet will be called 1-truncation,
and a globular set in the essential image of this functor will be said to be 1-
truncated. We shall often identify the subcategory of 1-truncated globular sets
with the category of graphs.
3. The Martin-Lo¨f complex monad
The goal of this section is to state the formal definition of Martin-Lo¨f com-
plexes. Because Martin-Lo¨f complexes are defined to be algebras for a monad on
the category of reflexive globular sets the principal matter addressed here is the
construction of the appropriate monad. The monad for the theory Tω obtained
by the construction below essentially corresponds to the monad obtained from the
operadic constructions due to van den Berg and Garner [4] and Lumsdaine [14],
who show that the algebras are weak omega-groupoids. It is worth emphasizing
that, because the converse seems not to hold, the problem of determining precisely
the higher-dimensional structure of the algebras for these monads remains open. It
is to the solution of this problem that the results of the present paper contribute.
Because we will be interested in algebras for the monad generated by theories,
such as the theories Tn described in Section 3.5 below, which extend Tω the de-
scription of the monad involved in the definition of Martin-Lo¨f complexes will be
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described for an arbitrary extension of Tω. As such, throughout this section T is
assumed to be an arbitrary theory extending Tω. Finally, observe that although
we choose to work with reflexive globular sets, the construction of the monad can
be modified to yield a corresponding monad for globular sets.
3.1. Notation for iterated identity types and other conventions. In order
to most efficiently (and readably) state some of the additional principles for identity
types that we consider it is useful to introduce notation for iterated identity types.
Fixing a type A together with terms a, b : A in some ambient context, we introduce
the (at this stage superfluous) notation
A0 := A, and
A1(a, b) := A(a, b).
In general, assuming given terms
⊢ an+1, bn+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn),
we define
An+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn; an+1, bn+1) := A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn)(an+1, bn+1).
In the sequel we will be dealing extensively with sets of terms from various theories
extending Tω. We adopt the convention that such terms are always assumed to be
identified modulo definitional equality and α-equivalence.
As a notational convenience we adopt the convention of, given a reflexive globular
set G = (Gn)n≥0, writing G for the set
∑
n≥0Gn.
3.2. The reflexive globular set generated by a type. Fix a type A in T. It
is possible that A is a type in context, yet we will assume that A is a type in the
empty context. The case where the context is non-empty is obtained in essentially
the same way, and so this is a reasonable simplification. We will now construct
a reflexive globular set denoted by Γ(A)T and called the reflexive globular set
generated by A (in T). When the theory T is fixed we will omit the subscript
and write simply Γ(A). This construction will be carried out in such a way that
the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Each element of Γ(A)n is a tuple of (2n + 1) elements of the set of terms
of T.
(2) If both (~α;β) and (~α;β′) are in Γ(A)n, then ⊢ A
n+1(~α;β, β′) : type is
derivable in T.
(3) The source and target maps s, t : Γ(A)n+1 → Γ(A)n must send a tuple
(α0, . . . , α2n) to (α0, . . . , α2n−2) and (α0, . . . , α2n−3, α2n−1), respectively.
We begin by defining
Γ(A)0 := {a | ⊢ a : A},
Γ(A)1 :=
{
(a0, a1; α) | a0, a1 ∈ Γ(A)0 and ⊢ α : A(a0, a1)
}
,
and the maps s, t : Γ(A)1 → Γ(A)0 are simply the projections π0, π1 sending
(a0, a1; α) to a0 and a1, respectively. Assuming Γ(A) has been constructed up to
stage n, we define Γ(A)n+1 to be the following set{
(~α; β0, β1; γ) | (~α; βi) ∈ Γ(A)n for i = 0, 1, and ⊢ γ : A
n+1(~α; β0, β1)
}
.
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The source and target maps s, t : Γ(A)n+1 → Γ(A)n are given by the projections
(~α; β0, β1; γ) (~α; βi),
✤ //
for i = 0 and i = 1, respectively.
Lemma 3.1. Given an extension T of Tω and a (closed) type A of T, the graded
set Γ(A) described above is a reflexive globular set.
Proof. The maps i : Γ(A)n → Γ(A)n+1 are obtained using reflexivity terms. The
equations for reflexive globular sets are then readily verified. 
3.3. The type theory associated to a reflexive globular set. Not only does
every type A give rise to a reflexive globular set, but also every reflexive globular
set G gives rise to a type theory T[G].
Definition 3.2. Given a reflexive globular set G, the type theory T[G] generated
by G (or T with G adjoined) is obtained by augmenting T with the following
additional symbols and rules:
• A basic type ⊢ pGq;
• Basic terms ⊢ pgq : pGq, for each vertex g ∈ G0;
• Basic terms ⊢ pfq : pGq(pgq, phq), for each element f ∈ G1 with s(f) = g
and t(f) = h;
• Basic terms
⊢ pαq : pGq n
(
pα00q, pα
0
1q; pα
1
0q, pα
1
1q; · · · ; pα
n−1
0 q, pα
n−1
1 q
)
(3)
where αji for i = 0, 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 are as defined in Section 2.9, for
each α ∈ Gn;
• New conversion rules:
pi(α)q = r
(
pαq
)
: pGqn+1
(
. . . ; pαq, pαq
)
for every α ∈ Gn.
Remark. As a matter of notation, we write Γ ⊢G J to indicate that the judgement
Γ ⊢ J is derivable in T[G]. Finally, we also write ExpG instead of the more
cumbersome Exp(T[G]). Also, when no confusion will result, we identify the symbol
pτq with τ itself. E.g., we write f : G(g, h) instead of the more cumbersome
pfq : pGq(pgq, phq).
In subsequent sections it will be convenient to have at our disposal techniques
for constructing maps between the sets of expressions of one type theory T[G] and
another T[H ], for G and H globular sets. Along these lines, we make the following
observation.
Lemma 3.3. Given globular sets G and H, any function
G ExpH
ϕ //
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has a unique extension ϕˆ : ExpG → ExpH , commuting with the operations from
which the expressions are formed, such that the following diagram of sets commutes:
ExpG ExpH
ϕˆ //
G
iG
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
ϕ
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
where iG is the map sending g ∈ Gn to pgq.
Note that the basic type pGq is sent by the extension ϕˆ to pHq. Of course,
depending on the nature of ϕ the extension ϕˆ may or may not preserve derivable
judgements. Such a ϕˆ will, however, commute with substitution. I.e., if e(x) is an
expression of T[G] with x free, then, for any other expression f ,
ϕˆ(e)[ϕˆ(f)/x] = ϕˆ(e[f/x]). (4)
3.4. The induced monad on globular sets. We will now see that composing
the foregoing processes
G 7−→ T[G], and
A : type 7−→ Γ(A),
yields a monad T on the category rGSet of reflexive globular sets. Given a globular
set G,
T (G) := Γ(pGq). (5)
Suppose given a map ϕ : G→ H of globular sets. To see that this assignment is in
fact functorial we begin by noting that, by Lemma 3.3, the map
g 7−→ pϕ(g)q
for g ∈ Gn, possesses a canonical extension ϕ∗ : ExpG → ExpH . I.e., in the notation
of Lemma 3.3,
ϕ∗ := îH ◦ ϕ.
In order to be able to use ϕ∗ to define the action of T on arrows we must first
verify that it preserves derivable judgements, where the action of ϕ∗ extends to
judgements in the obvious manner.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose J is a judgement derivable in T[G], then ϕ∗(J ) is derivable
in T[H ].
Proof. The proof is a straightforward induction on the structure of derivations
⊢G J . For example, suppose J is the conclusion Γ ⊢G λx:A.b(x) :
∏
x:A .B(x)
of the introduction rule for dependent products. Then we have by the induction
hypothesis that
ϕ∗(Γ), x : ϕ∗(A) ⊢H ϕ∗(b(x)) : ϕ∗(B(x)).
Applying the introduction rule in T[H ] yields the appropriate judgement since
ϕ∗
(∏
x:A
.B(x)
)
=
∏
x:ϕ∗(A)
.ϕ∗(B)(x),
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by definition of ϕ∗. The only case which merits special attention are those judge-
ments of the form (3) which occur as axioms of T[G]. Such judgements are preserved
by the fact that ϕ is a map of globular sets. 
Lemma 3.5. The assignment (5) is functorial T : rGSet→ rGSet.
Proof. Let
T (ϕ)(α0, α1, · · · , α2n) :=
(
ϕ∗(α0), ϕ∗(α1), · · · , ϕ∗(α2n)
)
,
for ~α in T (G)n+1. That this definition makes sense follows from Lemma 3.4 and
the definition of ϕ∗. Trivially, T (1G) = 1T (G). To see that T is well behaved with
respect to composition it suffices to show that, when given ψ : H → I, we have
(ψ ◦ ϕ)∗ = ψ∗ ◦ ϕ∗.
For this we observe that on the generators g ∈ Gn,
ψ∗
(
ϕ∗(pgq)
)
= ψ∗
(
pϕ(g)q
)
= pψ ◦ ϕ(g)q = (ψ ◦ ϕ)∗(pgq).

As a notational convenience we will often write elements ~α ∈ T (G) in terms
of their boundaries. I.e., we write ~α = (α00, α
0
1; . . . ;α
n−1
0 , α
n−1
1 ;α) instead of
(α0, α1, . . . , α2n).
Proposition 3.6. T : rGSet→ rGSet is the functor part of a monad.
Proof. Given a globular set G, the unit ηG : G→ T (G) is the “insertion of genera-
tors” defined by setting
ηG(g) :=
(
pg00q, pg
0
1q, · · · , pgq
)
for g ∈ Gn. This is a globular map which is natural in G by definition.
For the multiplication µG : T
2G → TG we begin by defining τG : ExpTG →
ExpG to be the canonical extension, which exists by Lemma 3.3, of the assignment
π : TG→ ExpG given by
(α00, α
0
1; . . . ;α
n−1
0 , α
n−1
1 ;α) 7−→ α,
where ~α is in (TG)n. That is, τG = πˆ is the canonical extension such that
ExpTG ExpG
τG //
TG
iTG
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
π
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
commutes. As such, given ~α in (TG)n as above,
τG
(
p~αq
)
= α,
where this definition makes sense because α is itself a term of T[G]. We would like
to show that τG preserves derivable judgements. As in the proof of Lemma 3.4, the
non-trivial step is to verify that the axioms added in the formation of T[TG] are
preserved. That is, where ~α is as above, we need to show that
⊢TG p~αq : pTGq
n
(
p(~α)00q, . . . , p(~α)
n−1
1 q
)
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implies the corresponding judgement in T[G]. But, we have that
τG
(
p(~α)ijq
)
= αij . (6)
Thus, we must show that
⊢G α : pGq
n(α00, . . . , α
n−1
1 ).
However, this is a trivial consequence of the fact that ~α is an element of (TG)n.
Therefore τG preserves derivable judgements and we may define
µG(β
0
0 , . . . , β
n−1
1 , β) :=
(
τG(β
0
0), . . . , τG(β
n−1
1 ), τG(β)
)
,
for ~β in (T 2G)n. Since τG preserves valid judgements this gives a globular map
which is natural in G.
To see that the first unit law for monads is satisfied, let ~α in (TG)n be given as
above. Then
µG ◦ ηTG(~α) = µG
(
p(~α)00q, . . . , p(~α)
n−1
1 q, p~αq
)
=
(
τG
(
p(~α)00q
)
, . . . , τG
(
p(~α)n−11 q
)
, τG
(
p~αq
))
= ~α,
where the final equation is by (6). For the other unit law, observe that the following
diagram commutes:
G
ExpG
iG
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
TGηG
//
ExpTG
(ηG)∗ //
iTG
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
ExpG
τG //
π
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
Thus, τG ◦ (ηG)∗ ◦ iG = iG and, by Lemma 3.3, µG ◦ T (ηG) = 1TG.
Next, to see that the multiplication law is satisfied it suffices to prove that
τG ◦ τTG = τG ◦ (µG)∗. (7)
Given ~β = (β00 , β
0
1 ; . . . ;β
n−1
0 , β
n−1
1 ;β) in (T
2G)n we have
τG ◦ τTG
(
p~βq
)
= τG(β)
= τG
(
p
(
τG(β
0
0), τG(β
0
1), . . . , τG(β)
)
q
)
= τG
(
pµG(~β)q
)
= τG ◦ (µG)∗
(
p~βq
)
.
Thus, by Lemma 3.3, (7) holds. 
Example 3.7. Suppose g is a vertex of G, then p(pgq)q is likewise a vertex of T 2G.
The multiplication µG acts on such a vertex by removing the outermost p−q. I.e.,
µG
(
p(pgq)q
)
= pgq.
Similarly, if f is in Gn, then
µG
(
p(pf00q, pf
0
1q, . . . , pf
n−1
1 q, pfq)q
)
= (pf00q, . . . , pfq).
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The action of µG on composite terms (constructed out of the basic terms of T[TG]
using the rules of T) is then to go through the term recursively removing occurrences
of p−q. Thus, the unit acts by adding p−q and the multiplication acts by removing
it.
3.5. Martin-Lo¨f complexes and other categories of algebras. It is possible
to extend Proposition 3.6 by allowing the extension T of Tω employed in the con-
struction to vary. We denote by Ext(Tω) the category of all extensions of Tω.
I.e., the objects of Ext(Tω) are dependent type theories extending Tω (where we
only allow those extensions obtained by the addition of set-many new symbols and
rules). A morphism T → T′ in Ext(Tω) is an inclusion of theories (i.e., such a
morphism exists whenever T′ extends T). We also denote by Mon(rGSet) the
category of monads on rGSet (regarded as monoids in [rGSet, rGSet]).
Lemma 3.8. The construction of a monad on rGSet from an extension of Tω
from Section 3.4 gives the action on objects of a functor
T : Ext(Tω) −→Mon(rGSet).
Proof. Assume given theories T and T′ in Ext(Tω) such that T
′ is an extension of
T. We will now describe the induced natural transformation ξ : T → T ′, where
we write T and T ′ as abbreviations for T (T) and T (T′), respectively. Given a
reflexive globular set G and an element ~α = (α00, . . . , α
n−1
1 , α) of T (G)n, we note
that since T′ extends T it follows that each component of the list ~α is also a
term of T′[G]. Moreover, all of these terms necessarily possess the appropriate
boundaries so that ~α is also an element of T ′(G)n. As such, we may simply define
(ξG)n : T (G)n → T ′(G)n to be the map which sends any ~α as above to itself
(now regarded as a list of terms from T′[G]). This clearly describes a map of
reflexive globular sets which is clearly ξ is natural and that it commutes with the
multiplication and unit maps for T and T ′. Finally, it is trivial to see that, with
this definition T is functorial. 
The specific extensions of Tω to which we would like to apply Lemma 3.8 are
obtained by augmenting Tω by axioms that force the identity types to be trivial
once they have been iterated sufficiently many times. To begin with, recall that
the reflection rule for identity types is the principle which states that all identity
types are trivial in the sense that
⊢ a, b : A ⊢ p : A(a, b)
Reflection
⊢ a = b : A
Higher-dimensional generalizations of this rule are then given by “truncating” the
identity types only after they have been iterated a certain number of times. Ex-
plicitly, the n-truncation rule is stated as follows:
⊢ an+1, bn+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn) ⊢ p : A
n+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an+1, bn+1)
TRn
⊢ an+1 = bn+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn)
With these rules at our disposal we are able to describe the type theories extending
Tω with which we will be concerned. Explicitly, for n ≥ 0, the theory Tn is defined
to be the result of adding to Tω the (instances of the) principle TRn. These theories
then arrange themselves according to the following hierarchy of theories:
Tω ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tn+1 ⊆ Tn ⊆ · · · ⊆ T1 ⊆ T0, (8)
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since TRm clearly implies TRn, when m < n. The theory T0 is also known as
extensional type theory as contrasted with the intensional type theory Tω.
Definition 3.9. Denote by Mω the monad T (Tω). A reflexive globular set G is
a Martin-Lo¨f complex (or ML-complex) if it is an algebra for Mω. We write
MLCx for the Eilenberg-Moore category consisting of Mω-algebras and homomor-
phisms thereof. Similarly, we denote by MLCxn the category of Mn-algebras for
n = 0, 1, 2, . . ., where Mn denotes the monad T (Tn).
Corresponding to the hierarchy of theories (8) we obtain, by Lemma 3.8, the
following sequence of inclusions of categories:
MLCx0 −→ · · · −→MLCxn −→MLCxn+1 −→ · · · −→MLCxω
and it is our goal to understand how these categories relate to the hierarchy of
categories of homotopy types discussed in Section 1.
3.6. Connection between truncation and other rules. The truncation prin-
ciples TRn are related to several other type theoretic principles which we employ
occasionally in the sequel. For example consider the following n-dimensional gen-
eralization of the principle of (definitional) uniqueness of identity proofs:
⊢ an+1, bn+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn)
UIPn
⊢ an+1 = bn+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn)
The question whether UIP1 — or the variant where the definitional equality occur-
ring in the conclusion is replaced by a propositional equality — is derivable in Tω
was one of the motivations for the original groupoid model due to Hofmann and
Streicher [8]. In particular, the groupoid model shows that neither UIP1 nor the
propositional version are derivable in Tω .
Another related principle is the n-dimensional ordinary unit principle
⊢ an+1 : A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn) ⊢ p : A
n+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an+1, an+1)
OUPn
⊢ p = r(an+1) : A
n+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an+1, an+1)
Whereas the uniqueness of identity proofs principles can be thought of as requiring
that the identity types are preorders above a given dimension, the ordinary unit
rules indicate that all loops (above certain dimensions) are necessarily identities.
The truncation and ordinary unit principles have been considered previously by
Garner in [6] and by Warren in [21]. The relation between the truncation, unique-
ness of identity proofs and ordinary unit principles are clarified in the following
lemma (the idea for the proof of which comes essentially from results, which are
not “stratified” in the way considered here, from [20]).
Lemma 3.10. Assuming the rules of Tω and the usual rules for identity types, the
following implications hold:
(1) TRn implies OUPn.
(2) TRn implies UIPn+1.
(3) UIPn implies TRn.
for n ≥ 0.
Proof. For (1), let a term an+1 of type A
n(a1, b1; · · · ; an, bn) and a “loop” p of type
An+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an+1, an+1) be given. Then, by TRn it suffices to show that
⊢ p ≃ r(an+1) : A
n+1(a1, b1; · · · ; an+1, an+1).
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To this end, observe that, by TRn, the type
x, y : An(an, bn), z : A
n+1(x, y) ⊢ An+2
(
z, r(x)
)
is derivable. Therefore, the elimination rule for identity types gives us
J(r(x), an+1, an+1, p) : A
n+2
(
p, r(an+1)
)
,
as required. (This proof essentially shows that Streicher’s K rule [20] is derivable
for identity types of the form An+1.)
Suppose, for the proof of (2), that we are given terms an+2 and bn+2 of type
An+1(a1, b1; · · · an+1, bn+1). Then, by TRn, an+1 = bn+1. By (1) it follows that
OUPn holds and therefore we obtain
an+2 = r(an+1) = bn+2,
as required.
Finally, (3) holds trivially. 
3.7. Skeletal terms. In this section we introduce a convenient technical tool which
will later facilitate reasoning about the type theories at hand and their models.
Let us denote by T+κ the theory Tκ[0] for κ = 0, 1, . . . , ω. This theory is the
same as Tκ except that it also has a new distinguished type symbol p0q. All of the
theories of the form Tκ[G] are extensions of T
+
κ .
Definition 3.11. A judgement J of Tκ[G] is skeletal if no basic term symbols
(coming from G) occur in J .
If J is a skeletal judgement in Tκ[G], then there is a corresponding judgement
J+ in T+κ obtained by replacing each occurrence of the basic type pGq by p0q.
Similarly, any judgement J has a corresponding translation J G into any Tκ[G] by
replacing each occurrence of p0q by pGq. We have the following basic observation
about the derivability of skeletal judgements:
Lemma 3.12. A skeletal judgement J is derivable in Tκ[G] if and only if J + is
derivable in T+κ .
Obviously the analogous statement which says that J is derivable in T+κ if and
only if J G is derivable in Tκ[G] also holds. Accordingly, we will henceforth not
distinguish between the judgements J , J+ and JG.
Assume that H is a finite reflexive globular set and define a context ∆H in T
+
κ
as follows. ∆H consists of:
• For each 0-cell a of H , there is a distinct variable declaration va : p0q.
• For each (n + 1)-cell f of H , there is a distinct variable declaration vf :
p0qn(vs(f), vt(f)).
Because H is finite this determines a well-defined context.
Fix some κ = 0, 1, . . . , ω. We now define a new category CκH as follows.
Definition 3.13. A context relative to H is a skeletal context Γ extending ∆H .
Given contexts Γ and Θ relative to H , a context morphism σ : Γ→ Θ relative
to H is a skeletal context morphism such that
Γ Θ
σ //
∆H
❄
❄❄
❄❄
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧
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commutes.
The category CκH has as objects contexts in T
+
κ relative to H and as arrows
context morphisms in T+κ relative to H . In fact, we have a comprehension category
(cf. [10]) with base CκH and with fibration P
κ
H : T
κ
H → C
κ
H determined by letting
the fiber T κH (Γ) consists of the skeletal types in context Γ. This determines a split
Grothendieck fibration since skeletal types are stable under skeletal substitutions
and there is an obvious comprehension map χκH : T
κ
H → (C
κ
H)
→ which sends a
skeletal type Γ ⊢ A to the dependent projection (Γ, x : A)→ Γ.
Lemma 3.14. The comprehension category CκH is a model of Tκ[H ].
Proof. There is an obvious forgetful functor CκH → CTκ[H], the usual syntactic model
of Tκ[H ], and this functor preserves the comprehension category structure. All
type and term formation operations respect skeletalness w.r.t. ∆H . Therefore, the
category CκH also supports dependent products, sums, natural numbers and identity
types, and the forgetful functor creates these.
Now CκH becomes a model of Tκ[H ] by interpreting a basic term a as the variable
va. 
Let us write skH(J ) for the interpretation of a judgement J of Tκ[H ]. It follows,
by induction on derivations, that the substitution σH given by va 7→ paq satisfies
skH(J )[σH ] ≡ J . (9)
Indeed, σH induces a morphism of models CκH → CTκ[H] where again CTκ[H] is the
syntactic model. This morphism is in fact an isomorphism of models, with inverse
induced by skH (which sends contexts and context morphisms to their “skeletalized”
counterparts, i.e. it replaces each basic term by the appropriate variable).
In the case where H is no longer finite matters become less straightforward.
Lemma 3.15. Given any reflexive globular set G there exists, for any judgement
J of Tκ[G], a skeletal judgement sk(J ) together with a substitution σJ consisting
entirely of basic terms such that
sk(J )[σJ ] ≡ J .
Proof. Fix a derivation of J . There is a corresponding finite reflexive globular set
H obtained as the sub-reflexive globular set of G generated by those cells of G
occurring in the fixed derivation of J . By the observations above we have skH(J )
satisfying (9). But skH(J ) is also a derivable term in Tκ[G] and σH is also a
substitution in Tκ[G]. As such, we may take sk(J ) to be skH(J ) and σJ to be
σH . 
Note that there may exist more than one skeletal judgement sk(J ) and more
than one σJ satisfying the equation from Lemma 3.15 since one may have multiple
derivations of the same judgement J which employ different basic terms. We might
hope to choose a “minimal” derivation in some way and define a canonical skeleton
of J in that way, but this is also not possible in the presence of truncation rules. For
example, if p, q : An(a, b) and t : B(a) where we are in the situation that trunaction
applies at level n, then we have two distinct derivations of t : B(b) which employ
distinct contexts of basic terms. Nonetheless, any two derivations which employ
the same basic terms will give rise to the same skeletal judgement and substitution.
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Remark. Instead of the above model theoretic proof that for every derivable judge-
ment there exists a derivable skeletal judgement and a suitable substitution to
recover the original judgement one can also work purely syntactically by defining
a translation on the level of expressions which replaces every basic term paq by a
variable va and which commutes with all other formation rules. Then one can show
by a straightforward induction on derivations that if all basic terms in a derivation
of a judgement come from the finite globular set H , then the translated judgement
is derivable when we work in the context ∆H .
One of the advantages of having Lemma 3.15 at our disposal is that it allows us to
give an alternative characterization of the monad Mκ. Let M˜κ(G) be the reflexive
globular set which has as cells (of the appropriate level) equivalence classes of tuples
(Γ, ϕ, σ) such that Γ ⊢ ϕ is a skeletal judgement and σ is a substitution () → Γ
such that ϕ is required to have the appropriate type (i.e., for 0-cells Γ ⊢ ϕ : pGq,
et cetera). Here
(Γ, ϕ, σ) ≈ (∆, ψ, τ) if and only if ⊢ ϕ[σ] = ψ[τ ].
Equivalently, by Lemma 3.15 (taking a skeleton of the judgement ⊢ ϕ[σ] = ψ[τ ]),
(Γ, ϕ, σ) ≈ (∆, ψ, τ) if and only if there exists a skeletal context Θ extending both
Γ and ∆ and a substitution ϑ : () → Θ extending both σ and τ such that Θ ⊢
ϕ = ψ. M˜κ is readily seen to constitute a monad on the category of reflexive
globular sets using the same approach as in the definition of the monad structure
on Mκ. Furthermore, there is an isomorphism λ : Mκ ∼= M˜κ of monads described
as follows. Given t in Mκ(G) choose, by Lemma 3.15, a skeleton (∆, ϕ, σ) of t
and let λG(t) := [∆, ϕ, σ]. This is independent of choice of representative from the
definitional equality class of t and of the choice of skeleton by definition of ≈. Going
the other way, given [∆, ϕ, σ] let λ−1G send this data to the definitional equality class
of ϕ[σ]. Again, this is trivially independent of the choice of representative. It is clear
that λ and λ−1 constitute a natural isomorphism and that they are compatible with
the respective monad structures. Henceforth we will freely employ this isomorphism
without explicit mention where convenient.
3.8. Limits and colimits of algebras. The aim of this section is to show that
the monadsMκ are finitary. One consequence of this is thatMLCxκ is cocomplete
as well as being complete.
Assume given a filtered category I and a functor A : I → rGSet. Denote by
A∞ the colimit of this functor. By definition, an n-cell of A∞ is an equivalence class
[a] of n-cells of the coproduct
∐
iA(i), where a ∈ A(i) is equivalent to a
′ ∈ A(j) if
and only if there exist arrows ϕ : i→ k and ϕ′ : j → k in I such that
A(ϕ)(a) = A(ϕ′)(a′).
We would like to prove that
Mκ(A
∞) ∼= lim−→
i
Mκ
(
A(i)
)
. (10)
This will require an analysis of the valid derivations of the theory Tκ[A
∞]. To
begin with, note that Tκ[A
∞] is obtained by augmenting Tκ with the new basic
type pA∞q as well as with basic terms p[a]q of the appropriate types as described
in Section 3.
Assume we are given a derivable judgement J of the theory Tκ[A∞]. Then it
follows from Lemma 3.15 that we have a skeleton sk(J ) and the corresponding
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substitution σJ . Suppose the basic terms occurring in σJ are p[a1]q, . . . , p[an]q,
where it is possible that n = 0, then it follows from the fact that I is filtered that
we may find representatives a′1, . . . , a
′
n of the equivalence classes [a1], . . . , [an] such
that a′1, . . . , a
′
n are all in the same Ai for some i ∈ I. Therefore, we obtain a new
substitution σ′J by substituting pa
′
1q, . . . , pa
′
nq instead of the corresponding terms
in σJ . So the judgement sk(J )[σ′J ] is derivable in Tκ[Ai]. By considering the case
where J is an appropriate term judgement we are able to use this line of reasoning
to show that (10) holds.
Lemma 3.16. Given a filtered category I together with a functor A : I → rGSet,
there is an isomorphism (10) of reflexive globular sets.
Proof. Assume given a reflexive globular setX together with a cocone xi :MκA(i)→
X . We now describe the induced map ξ : MκA
∞ → X . Given an element τ of
MκA
∞ we have, by the reasoning above, the term τ ′ := sk(τ)[σ′τ ] in MκA
i. There-
fore, we define:
ξ(τ) := xi(τ
′).
This is immediately seen to be independent of the choice of a′1, . . . , a
′
n. To see that
the definition does not depend on the choice of skeleton we use the fact that two
skeleta τ can be obtained as restrictions of another skeleton with a larger ambient
context. Moreover, it follows from this definition that each xi can be recovered
by precomposing ξ with the map MκA(i) → MκA∞. Finally, for uniqueness of ξ,
observe that implicit the construction of ξ above we have proved that for each cell
τ of MκA
∞ there exists some i such that τ is in the image of the map MκA(i)→
MκA
∞. 
By general results from category theory (see e.g. [2]) we have the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 3.17. For each κ = 0, 1, . . . , ω, the category MLCxκ is complete and
cocomplete.
4. Doppelga¨ngers, M0-algebras and M1-algebras
Our purpose in this section is to characterize the category MLCx0 of algebras
for the monad M0 by proving that it is equivalent to the category of sets and to in-
troduce the basic machinery which will allow us, in Section 5 below, to characterize
the category MLCx1. The 0-dimensional case is already instructive and provides
us with an opportunity to introduce some ideas and concepts which will be put to
work in a more complicated setting in the 1-dimensional case.
We begin by discussing the reason why the results are nontrivial by explaining the
various ways in which the type theory T0[G] proves the existence of infinitely many
duplicates of all of the vertices, edges, and higher edges of the globular set G. These
duplicates (here called doppelga¨ngers) must all be shown to be propositionally equal
to elements of the original globular set G.
Next, we establish the characterization of the M0-algebras in a number of steps,
making use of the set-theoretic interpretation of extensional type theories and the
realizability semantics from [9]. We will concentrate on stating the main concepts
and theorems and omit some of the detailed proofs, allowing the reader to follow
the line of argument.
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4.1. Doppelga¨ngers. Fix a globular set G and consider the type theory Tω[G]
(or any extension of it). It is clear from the definition of the theory Tω[G] that
every vertex a ∈ G0 is represented as a term in Tω[G], namely a : G. (We shall, as
before, not distinguish between an actual element in G and its “name” in the type
theory.) Similarly, every 1-dimensional edge f ∈ G1 is represented by f : G(a, b),
where s(f) = a, t(f) = b, and so on in higher dimensions. One might, at first sight,
conjecture that these are the only judgements of this form, i.e. that whenever Tω[G]
derives τ : G for a closed term τ , then τ must be an element of G already, and
whenever Tω [G] derives σ : G(a, b) then σ ∈ G1 already. However, things are more
complicated than that, due to the elimination rule for identity types.
Suppose, for example, that we have a, b, c ∈ G0 and a non-reflexivity term
f : a→ b in G1. Now we can consider the following derivation:
x : G, y : G, z : G(x, y) ⊢ G : type
x : G ⊢ c : G
⊢ f : G(a, b)
Id elimination
⊢ J
(
[x : G]c, a, b, f) : G
This creates a new term of type G which we denote by c〈f〉; we call it the dop-
pelga¨nger of c (at f). This term is not definitionally equal to any of a, b, c.
However, it is propositionally equal to c: this we can see from the derivation
x : G, y : G, z : G(x, y) ⊢ G(c, J
(
[v : G]c, x, y, z)) : type
x : G ⊢ r(c) : G(c, J
(
[v : G]c, x, x, r(x))
⊢ f : G(a, b)
Id elimination
⊢ J
(
[x : G]c, a, b, f) : G(c, J
(
[v : G]c, a, b, f))
showing that there is a term witnessing c ≃ c〈f〉 (note that by the conversion rule
the second premise reduces to x : G ⊢ r(c) : G(c, c) so that the trivial term is
well-defined).
Of course, this idea works in general: given any term τ : T and any (non-
reflexivity) identity proof f : A(a, b) we may form
τ〈f〉 := J([x : A]τ, a, b, f) : T
and then show that τ ≃ τ〈f〉.
There are other ways to create doppelga¨ngers: consider again f : a → b ∈ G1
and form
f ♯ := J[x,y:G,z:G(x,y)]G([x : G]x, a, b, f) : G.
This term is a new vertex which is homotopic to both a and b (again this is proved
by defining a suitable witness using the J-rule).
Yet another possibility is to construct
f ♭ := J[x,y:G,z:G(x,y)]G(x,y)([x : G]r(x), a, b, f) : G(a, b),
which turns out to be homotopic to f .
While in the above examples of doppelga¨ngers it is easy to show that each of
the newly created terms is, up to homotopy, equal to a basic term coming from the
original globular set, it is not clear why this would always be the case, i.e. why for
every term derivable in Tω[G] there is a suitable homotopy. Moreover, it will be
seen in the next section that the elimination rule for identity types does in certain
instances give genuinely new terms which are not homotopic to any basic term
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(namely, the formal composites which are used to give the Martin-Lo¨f complexes
their categorical structure).
4.2. M0-algebras. We now study the category of algebrasMLCx0 for the monad
M0. We fix a reflexive globular set G, and consider M0(G), the free algebra on G.
Lemma 4.1. The reflexive globular set M0(G) is constant.
Proof. Since the theory T0[G] satisfies the reflection rule, it follows that any term
τ : Gn(a, b) is definitionally equal to a reflexivity term (see Subsection 3.6 above).
Hence for n > 0, the elements of M0(G)n are all degenerate, and the globular set
M0(G) is completely determined by its vertices. 
Thus in order to characterize the globular set M0(G), it suffices to understand
the set M0(G)0 of its vertices. Recall from the construction of the monad M0 that
the elements of M0(G)0 are equivalence classes of closed terms τ : G, where two
of these are identified if the theory proves that they are definitionally equal. We
begin by noting that there is a canonical map from π0(G) to M0(G)0, induced by
the coequalizer
G1
s //
t
// G0
e // //
η0 ##●
●●
●●
●●
●●
π0(G)
p
✤
✤
✤
M0(G)0
(11)
Here, the map η0 is the component of the unit η : G → M0(G) at dimension 0.
For every f ∈ G1 with s(f) = a, t(f) = b there is an axiom f : G(a, b) in T0[G]; by
truncation this forces a = b in the theory, and hence a and b are identified as well
in M0(G); hence η0s = η0t.
We would like to show that p is a bijection; this would prove that M0 is isomor-
phic to the (idempotent) monad ∆π0 on rGSet, and in particular it would follow
that the category of M0-algebras is just the category of sets.
The first step in proving this is to exploit the fact that extensional ML type
theories may be modelled in locally cartesian closed categories (see the original
work of Seely [18], or the expository texts [10, 7]). In particular, these theories may
be soundly interpreted in the category of sets. More concretely, the theory T0[G]
has the following set-theoretic model: interpret the basic type G by the set π0(G),
and interpret the basic terms a : G by the element [a], the connected component of
a in G.
Lemma 4.2. The above interpretation extends to a model of T0[G] in the category
of sets.
Proof. We need only verify the new axioms and the new conversion rule of the
theory; if these are valid under the interpretation then the result follows by sound-
ness. By construction, the judgements a : G for a ∈ G are valid. The identity
types G(a, b) will be interpreted in a degenerate way, namely as the emptyset when
[a] 6= [b] and as the one element set when [a] = [b]. Thus if we have an element
f ∈ G1 with s(f) = a and t(f) = b, then the interpretation of f may be taken
to be [a] = [b], since the reflection rule allows us to derive a = b from the axiom
f : G(a, b). Similar reasoning works to show that the term judgements associ-
ated to higher cells of G are soundly interpreted. Finally, the new conversion rule
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i(a) = r(a) holds under the interpretation since both sides of the equation will be
interpreted as [a]. 
The soundness of this interpretation guarantees that the map p is injective:
indeed, given two connected components [a] and [b] of G, suppose that p[a] = p[b].
Then T0[G] proves that a = b. But then this equation should hold in the model
π0(G), i.e. [a] = [b] as elements of π0(G). In particular, the interpretation yields
a map q : M0G→ π0(G) of reflexive globular sets which is a retract of p. We will
show in the next section that q is in fact the inverse of p.
4.3. Combinatorial realizability models. In [9] it is shown how to construct
models of type theories such as Tκ[G] in such a way that the interpretations of terms
will provide additional data regarding the syntax of these theories. These models
are called combinatorial realizability models and can be seen as a generalized
form of realizability model in the usual sense where the realizers of terms can be,
intuitively, some kind of combinatorial data (in the cases we care about they will
usually be edges constructed in the syntax of the theory). We will explain the
conditions required in order for such a model to exist, but the proof of this fact is
somewhat involved and can be found in [9].
Definition 4.3. Given a reflexive globular set G, a notion of 1-realizability for
G is a functor real : Π1(M1(G))→ Set. (Here, Π1(X,α) is the underlying “funda-
mental” groupoid of the complex (X,α), see next section for details.) Similarly, a
notion of 0-realizability for G is a functor π0(M0(G))→ Set
We will often write τ  t : pGq to indicate that t is an element of real(t) and,
given f : t→ s in Π1(M1(G)) we write τ · f for real(f)(τ). The theorem regarding
combinatorial realizability models from [9] can then be stated precisely as follows:
Theorem 4.4 ([9]). Given a notion of 1-realizability for G satisfying the following
conditions:
• For each vertex a of G, there exists a realizer αa  paq : pGq.
• For each edge f : a→ b in G, we have αa · f = αb.
there exists a sound and complete model of T1[G] in which a closed term t of type
pGq is interpreted as a realizer αt  t : pGq and in which a closed term f : pGq(t, s)
is interpreted as a proof that αt · f = αs.
The following application of these models will be used twice in the remainder of
the paper:
Theorem 4.5. ([9]) Let G be a graph, H a groupoid and let P,Q : M1G → H be
two functors. Suppose furthermore that we are given a morphism αa : P (a)→ Q(a)
for each basic term a such that, for each basic term f : a→ b, the following diagram
commutes:
P (a)
P (f)

αa // Q(a)
Q(f)

P (b)
αb
// Q(b).
Then there exists a natural transformation α : P ⇒ Q whose component at a basic
term a is αa.
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There is a 0-dimensional variant of the model construction which allows us to
construct sound and complete models for theories of the form T0[G]. In this case,
a notion of 0-realizability is a Set-valued functor on M0(G), regarded as a discrete
groupoid.
Corollary 4.6. Given a notion of 0-realizability for G satisfying the first condition
of Theorem 4.4, there exists a sound and complete model of T0[G] in which a closed
term t of type pGq is interpreted as a realizer αt  t : pGq.
It follows from Corollary 4.6 that the map q : M0G → π0G is the inverse of
p : π0G→M0G (both of these are described in Section 4.2 above).
Lemma 4.7. For any G, the map p : π0G→M0G is an isomorphism with inverse
the map q described in Section 4.2.
Proof. Denote by ·¯ : M0G → M0G the function p ◦ q. Let τ  t : pGq if and only
if τ : pGq(t, t¯). This is a notion of 0-realizability. Moreover, the hypotheses of
Corollary 4.6 are satisfied since r(paq)  paq : pGq. Therefore, this determines a
combinatorial realizability model. Let us denote by αt the interpretation of t : pGq.
Then we have, for any vertex t inM0G, αt : pGq(t, t¯) and so, by 0-truncation, t = t¯,
as required. 
Proposition 4.8. There is an isomorphism of categories MLCx0 ∼= Set.
Proof. By Lemma 4.7 it follows that M0 is isomorphic to the monad ∆π0 and
therefore the resulting categories of algebras are isomorphic. 
4.4. Fundamental groupoids of M1-algebras. The aim of this section is to gen-
eralize the basic setup from Section 4.2 to the case of M1-algebras and the category
MLCx1. Contrary to what one might expect, this category is not equivalent to
the category of groupoids. However, there is an adjunction
MLCx1 Gpd66
vv
⊥ (12)
analogous to the adjunction between topological spaces or, better yet, homotopy
1-types, and groupoids.
We first describe the right adjoint Π1 : MLCx1 → Gpd which allows us to
regardM1-algebras as groupoids (where groupoids are themselves as reflexive glob-
ular sets in which all n-cells are degenerate for n ≥ 2 provided with the additional
structure of composites and inverses). That a M1-algebra can be endowed with the
structure of a groupoid follows immediately from the construction of composition
and inverse operations — as well as the corresponding propositional equalities wit-
nessing the associativity, unit and inverse laws — by Hofmann and Streicher [8].
However, we will later require some of the details of the proof of this fact and we
therefore describe the construction explicitly. First, recall that, given any type A
together with terms a, b : A and f : A(a, b), the inverse f−1 : A(b, a) of f is defined
to be the following elimination term:
f−1 := J[x,y:A,z:A(x,y)]A(y,x)
(
[x : A]r(x), a, b, f
)
.
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Moreover, when there exists a further propositional equality g : A(b, c), the com-
posite (g · f) of g with f is defined to be the term app
(
J(λv .v, b, c, g), f
)
, where
the J-term here is written in full as
J[x,y:A,z:A(x,y)]A(a,y)A(a,x)
(
[x : A]λv:A(a,x).v, b, c, g
)
: A(a, c)A(a,b).
We will use these operations on terms of identity type to define the composition
and inverses forM1-algebras. To this end, let an object G ofMLCx1 be given with
action γ :M1(G)→ G. Of course, we will regard G as a groupoid with objects the
vertices of G and arrows the edges of G. Identities are given by the edges of the
form i(a) for a a vertex. In order to define composition in G let a composable pair
of edges f, g in G be given with
a b
f // c.
g //
By definition, both of these edges (and their endpoints) are represented by cor-
responding terms f : G(a, b) and g : G(b, c) in the theory T1[G]. As such, the
composite (g · f) : G(a, c), as defined above, exists and we define the result of com-
posing f with g in G to be the edge obtained by appling the action of G to (g · f).
I.e.,
(g ◦ f) := γ
(
paq, pcq; (pgq · pfq)
)
.
This edge possesses the appropriate source and target since γ is an arrow in rGSet.
Likewise, the inverse f−1 of f is defined by setting
f−1 := γ(pbq, paq; pfq−1),
where f−1 on the right-hand side is the inverse of the term pfq, as defined above.
With these definitions, the groupoid laws are a consequence of their up-to propo-
sitional equality counterparts (for which see [8]) together with the 1-truncation
rule. In this way the unit law is an immediate consequence of the fact that
r(paq) = pi(a)q. For the associativity law, suppose we are given f and g as
above together with a further edge h : c → d in G. To prove the associative
law h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f) holds it suffices to show that
γ
(
phq · pγ
(
pgq · pfq
)
q
)
= γ
(
pγ
(
phq · pgq
)
q · pfq
)
, (13)
where we have omitted all but the final entries of lists of terms as the missing
entries are evident in this case. To see that this is indeed the case observe that the
left-hand side of (13) is equal to
γ
(
γ∗(pphqq) · γ∗(p(pgq · pfq)q)
)
= γ ◦M1(γ)(pphqq · p(pgq · pfq)q)
= γ ◦ µG(pphqq · p(pgq · pfq)q)
= γ
(
phq · (pgq · pfq)
)
where the penultimate equality is by the multiplication law for actions. By the
remarks above, phq · (pgq · pfq) is definitionally equal to (phq · (pgq · pfq). A dual
calculation reveals that the right-hand side of (13) is equal to γ((phq · pgq) · pfq).
Lastly, that f−1 is the inverse of f is straightforward using similar reasoning. That
is, we have described a groupoid Π1(G, γ) constructed from a M1-algebra (G, γ).
In slightly more abstract terms this construction can be described as follows. For
G an arbitrary reflexive globular set, let F(G) denote the free groupoid (regarding
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the free groupoid monad as a monad on reflexive globular sets) on G. Recall that
F(G) has the same vertices as G, and arrows a→ b in F(G) are a zig-zag paths
a
a1

⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
a2
❄
❄❄
❄❄

⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
an−1
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄ an

⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
b
❄
❄❄
❄❄
· · ·
· · ·
of edges in G modulo the evident relations forcing the groupoid laws to hold. There
is then, for each G, a map ΦG : F(G) → M1(G) of globular sets which sends an
equivalence class of such “formal composites” from F(G) to the term representing
the result of taking inverses and composites of its edges using the type theoretic
inverses and composites described above. These maps constitute a morphism of
monads F →M1 and therefore induce a functor Π1 :MLCx1 → Gpd. Explicitly,
Π1(G, γ) is given by the underlying globular set G together with the action γ ◦
ΦG : F(G) → G. Moreover, ΦG is actually the canonical functor ΦG : F(G) →
Π1(M1(G)) extending the unit G→M1(G) extends along the unit η′G for F :
F(G) Π1(M1(G))
ΦG //
G
η′G
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
ηG
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧
We sometimes call Π1(G, γ) the fundamental groupoid of (G, γ). It follows from
a general result of Kelly [12] (Theorem 25.4) that Π1 possesses a left-adjoint K :
Gpd →MLCx1. We will return to a dicussion of this adjunction later. First we
will turn to a proof that the maps ΦG constitute an equivalence of categories.
4.5. Interpretation of T1[G] using the free groupoid on G. The theory T1[G]
is soundly modelled using groupoids by extending the interpretation from [8] by the
following additional clauses:
• The new type pGq is interpreted as the free groupoid on G:
[[pGq]] := F(G).
• The new terms basic paq of type pGq are interpreted by the objects of F(G)
which they represent:
[[paq]] := a.
• The new basic terms pfq of identity type pGq(paq, pbq) are likewise inter-
preted as the arrows they represent
[[pfq]] := f.
• If pαq is a new basic term of type pGqn(pα00q, . . . , pα
n−1
1 q), for n > 1, then
[[pαq]] := α10.
With these definitions, the axioms of T1[G] are clearly satisfied. We now remind the
reader how the particular kinds of terms we are interested in are interpreted in this
model. To begin with recall that the identity type x, y : pGq ⊢ pGq(x, y) : type
is interpreted as the functor IG : F(G) × F(G) → Gpd which sends a pair of
objects (a, b) of F(G) to the discrete groupoid F(G)(a, b) and which sends an
arrow (α, β) : (a, b)→ (a′, b′) to the functor F(G)(a, b)→ F(G)(a′, b′) with action
f 7→ (β ◦ f ◦α−1). The extended context (x, y : pGq, z : pGq(x, y)) is interpreted as
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the result of applying the Grothendieck construction
∫
IG to IG. In this instance,∫
IG coincides with the arrow category F(G)→. As such, the elimination data
x : pGq ⊢ ϕ(x) : B(x, x, r(x)) is interpreted by a functor [[B]] : F(G)→ → Gpd
together with a functor [[ϕ]] : F(G)→
∫
[[B]] such that
F(G)
∫
[[B]]
ϕ //
F(G)→
π
r ((
commutes. I.e., for an object a of F(G), ϕ(a) is a tuple composed of 1a : a → a
together with an object, which we denote by aϕ, of the groupoid [[B]](1a : a → a).
For an arrow α : a→ a′ of F(G), ϕ(α) is then a tuple composed of α itself together
with an arrow
[[B]]


a a
1a //
a′ a′
1a′
//
α

α


 (aϕ) a′ϕαϕ //
in the groupoid [[B]](1a′ : a
′ → a′).
The resulting elimination term x, y : pGq, z : pGq(x, y) ⊢ J(ϕ, x, y, z) :
B(x, y, z) is interpreted as the section J of the projection
∫
[[B]] → F(G)→ which
sends an object f : a→ b of F(G)→ to the pair consisting of f and the object
[[B]]


a a
1a //
a b
f
//
1a

f


(aϕ)
of [[B]](a, b, f). Similarly, the action of J on an arrow
a b
f //
a′ b′g
//
α

β

(14)
from f : a → b to g : a′ → b′ in F(G)→ is the pair consisting of the arrow itself
together with
[[B]]


a′ a′
1a′ //
a′ b′g
//
1a′ 
g


(αϕ) : [[B]]


a a
1a //
a′ b′g
//
α

β◦f


 aϕ // [[B]]


a′ a′
1a′ //
a′ b′g
//
1a 
g


(a′ϕ)
So, for example, given a term h : pGq(g, g′) in T1[G], consider h
−1. The pattern
type B(x, y, z) in this instance is G(y, x) and [[B]] is the functor sending f : a→ b
to the discrete groupoid G(b, a) and which sends an arrow (14) in F(G)→ to the
functor λv.α ◦ v ◦ β−1 : G(b, a)→ G(b′, a′). As such, it is straightforward to verify
with the description of the interpretation given above that [[h−1]] is equal to the
inverse [[h]]−1 in F(G). Similarly, given f : pGq(a, b) and g : pGq(b, c) in T1[G], it
is straightforward to verify that the interpretation commutes with composition in
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the sense that [[pgq · pfq]] is equal to [[g]] ◦ [[f ]] in F(G). These observations yield
the following:
Lemma 4.9. The assignment ΨG : Π1(M1(G)) → F(G) which sends an n-cell
~α = (α00, . . . , α
n−1
1 , α) of M1(G) to [[α]] is functorial.
Proof. By the results of Section 4.4 it follows that M1(G) is a groupoid in with the
result of composing 1-cells (a, b; f) and (b, c; g) is (a, c; g · f). Thus, because the
interpretation function commutes with composition it follows that ΨG is functorial
(that ΨG preserves identities is also straightforward). 
Theorem 4.10. Given a reflexive globular set G, ΦG : F(G)→ Π1(M1(G)) is an
equivalence of categories.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the universal property of F(G) that ΦG
is a section of ΨG. Construct a combinatorial realizability model (as described in
Section 4.3 above) of T1[G] where realizers of terms of type pGq are given by letting
ϕ  t : pGq if and only if ϕ is a closed term
⊢ ϕ : pGq
(
t,ΦG(ΨG(t))
)
which satisfies ΨG(ϕ) = 1ψG(t). Realizers for basic terms paq are given by r(paq).
It follows from the results of [9] that this determines a model of type theory. Let
us denote the interpretation (i.e., realizer) of t : pGq by αt. Then, by virtue of the
interpretations of identity types in the realizability model, it follows that these αt
give a natural isomorphism α : 1Π1(M1(G))
∼= ΦG ◦ΨG. 
Theorem 5.8 shows that free M1-algebras are, up to equivalence, free groupoids.
This might lead one to conjecture that the category of M1-algebras is equivalent to
the category of groupoids. However, that is not the case. The following example
makes clear that different algebras may have the same fundamental groupoid.
Example 4.11. Consider the following groupoid G: it has two objects a and b,
exactly one arrow f : a→ b and its inverse g : b→ a. We may define a M1-algebra
structure γ :M1(G)→ G on G as follows: on objects, γ is defined by
γ(v) =
{
a if ⊢ v = paq : G is derivable
b otherwise
Thus, all doppelga¨ngers of vertices are sent to b. On 1-cells we define:
γ(w) =


f if γ(s(w)) = a, γ(t(w)) = b
g if γ(s(w)) = b, γ(t(w)) = a
1a if γ(s(w)) = a = γ(t(w))
1b if γ(s(w)) = b = γ(t(w))
It is readily seen that this is a map of globular sets. To see that it is aM1-algebra,
we remark that the unit law is trivially satisfied because the algebra map sends any
generator pvq of M1(G) to v. For the associativity law, consider an element τ of
M21 (G)0; this is a term of the theory T1[M1(G)], which is generated by basic terms
of the form pσq, where σ is a term of the theory T1[G]. Note that on the one hand
(γ ◦M1γ)(τ) = a⇔M1γ(τ) = paq⇔ τ = ppaqq,
while on the other hand
(γ ◦ µ)(τ) = a⇔ µ(τ) = paq⇔ τ = ppaqq,
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showing that both maps agree in dimension 0. To show that they agree in dimension
1 as well, one reasons in a similar fashion.
But clearly by symmetry there is another algebra structure on G, call it δ,
defined by sending all doppelga¨ngers to a instead of b. The identity map G → G
is, however, not a map of M1-algebras. Indeed, any map of M1-algebras commutes
with the formation of doppelga¨ngers; for example, if k is a map of algebras then
M1(k) must send the doppelga¨nger a〈f〉 to k(a)〈k(f)〉, and hence we must have
kγ(a〈f〉) = δk(a)〈k(f)〉, which is impossible if k is the identity. For the same reason
the only other possible map of groupoids, which interchanges a and b, cannot be a
map of M1-algebras.
Thus M1-algebras carry more information than their fundamental groupoids,
and this information tells us how the formal composites and doppelga¨ngers are
interpreted. The fact that non-isomorphic algebras may have the same fundamental
groupoid is of course the analogue of the fact that non-homeomorphic topological
spaces may have the same fundamental groupoid.
In addition, the above example shows that Π1 is not a full functor. (However, it
is easily seen to be faithful. ) Nonetheless, it will be shown in Section 5 below that
K ⊣ Π1 constitutes a Quillen equivalence and it is to this that we now turn.
5. The Quillen model structure on MLCx1
In this section we will only consider 1-truncated complexes, and we reduce clutter
in the notation by dropping subscripts indicating this one-dimensionality. Given an
object (A,α) ofMLCx1, we will sometimes denote the composition in the resulting
groupoid Π1(A,α) by ◦α.
We begin by defining the three classes of morphisms for the model structure on
MLCx1:
Fibrations: a map f of complexes is a fibration when Π1(f) is an isofibration
of groupoids. We denote the class of fibrations by F.
Weak Equivalences: a map f of complexes is a weak equivalence when
Π1(f) is a weak categorical equivalence. We denote by the class of weak
equivalences by W.
Cofibrations: A map of complexes is a cofibration when it has the left lifting
property with respect to maps which are simultaneously fibrations and weak
equivalences. The class of cofibrations will be denoted by C.
5.1. Cotensor of complexes with graphs. Let a complex (A,α) be given to-
gether with a graphX . We define a new complex (AX , χ) as follows. The underlying
graph has as 0-cells graph homomorphisms F : X → A and as 1-cells natural trans-
formations. Here naturality of a transformation η : F → G means that for each
vertex x of X we have a 1-cell ηx : Fx → Gx in A such that, for h : x → y in X ,
we have
ηy ◦α Fh = Gh ◦α ηx.
Now, fix a vertex x in X . We define an evaluation map εx : M1(A
X) → M1A
as the map of expressions (trivially seen to preserve derivable judgements) which
sends pFq to pFxq and pαq to pαxq. Before we can go any further we must make
some observations regarding these evaluation maps. We begin with the following
fact which follows immediately from the definition of εx:
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Lemma 5.1. The evaluation map εx :M1(A
X)→M1A is functorial.
For the following theorem we must construct a combinatorial realizability model
(see Section 4.3) of T1[A
X ]:
Theorem 5.2. Given an edge f : x → y in X, there is an induced natural trans-
formation εf : εx → εy.
Proof. We define ϕ  t : AX to hold if and only if ϕ : A(εxt, εyt). This has a
functorial action since given g : AX (t, s) and ϕ  t : A we have
εy(g) · ϕ · εx(g)
−1 : A(εxs, εys).
Moreover, since εx and εy are functorial it follows that this action on realizers is
also functorial. Basic terms pFq : AX are realized by
pFfq : B(pFxq, pFyq).
With these definitions the conditions for a combinatorial realizability model are met
and the existence of the natural transformation εf follows (cf. Theorem (4.5)). 
We will write the component εx(t) → εy(t) of εf at a vertex t as εf (t) and we
will assume that ε1x is the identity. We define the map χ :M1(A
X)→ AX by
χ(t)(x) := α
(
εx(t)
)
for t a vertex of M1(A
X) and x a vertex of X , and, for f : x→ y in X , we have
χ(t)(f) := α
(
εf (t)
)
.
Next, for g : t → s in M1(AX) we define χ(t) → χ(s) by taking at a vertex x the
map
χ(g)x := α
(
εx(g)
)
.
That this is a natural transformation is by naturality of the εf : εx → εy. I.e., we
have proved the following:
Lemma 5.3. The map χ is a graph homomorphism M1(A
X)→ AX .
It now remains to show that this map gives AX a M1-algebra structure.
Lemma 5.4. (AX , χ) is a complex.
Proof. The unit law is trivial. For the multiplication law assume given a term of
T1[M1(A
X)] of the form ϕ(pξq) where ξ ∈ M1(AX) and where ϕ(−) is skeletal
(note that we should really take an arbitrary list of basic terms pξq, but in the
more general case the argument is identical to the one given here). Then we must
show that
χ
(
ϕ(ξ)
)
= χ
(
ϕ(pχ(ξ)q)
)
.
It suffices to evaluate on x ∈ X . We then have
χ
(
ϕ(pχ(ξ)q)
)
(x) = α
(
εx(ϕ(pχ(ξ)q))
)
= α
(
ϕ(pα(εx(ξ))q)
)
= α
(
ϕ(εx(ξ))
)
= α
(
εx(ϕ(ξ))
)
,
where the third equation is by the fact that α is an algebra and the fourth equation
is by the fact that ϕ(−) is skeletal. 
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We will denote by X ⋔ (A,α) the algebra (AX , χ) when we do not want to have
to mention the action χ and we call this the cotensor of (A,α) with X .
Note that by construction of the map χ, the diagram
M(AX)
M(evx)=εx //
χ

MA
α

AX
evx
// A
commutes, where evx(F ) = F (x). Thus the evaluation maps are actually algebra
morphisms.
5.2. The path object argument. Where F denotes the free groupoid functor,
we have the following extremely useful fact:
Lemma 5.5. For any graph X and any complex (A,α), there is an isomorphism
of groupoids
Π1
(
X ⋔ (A,α)
)
∼= Π1(A,α)
FX .
Proof. This is routine using the universal property of FX and the definition of the
edges in X ⋔ (A,α) as natural transformations. 
Lemma 5.6. Each object (A,α) of MLCx1 has a path object factorization.
Proof. Let I be the graph with two vertices 0 and 1 and one non-trivial edge 0→ 1.
Then FI is the usual “interval” I in the category of groupoids. For any (A,α) we
have
(A,α) I ⋔ (A,α)
r //
(A,α) × (A,α)
∆
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄
p
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
(15)
where
r(a)(x) := a
and
p(H) := 〈H(0), H(1)〉.
It is routine to verify that these are algebra homomorphisms.
Using Lemma 5.5 and the fact that Π1 is a right-adjoint it follows that the result
of applying Π1 to (15) is
Π1(A) Π1(A)
I//
Π1(A) ×Π1(A)
∆
❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
❄
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
which, as is well known, constitutes a path object for Π1(A) in Gpd. Therefore,
the original diagram (15) is a path object in MLCx1. 
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Recall that Quillen’s path object argument provides conditions under which it
is possible to transfer a model structure from a category C to a category D along
an adjunction F ⊣ G for F : C → D.
Theorem 5.7 (Quillen). Assume given a cofibrantly generated model category C
together with an adjunction F ⊣ G for F : C → D where D is a cocomplete category
with finite limits. Assume furthermore that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The left-adjoint F preserves small objects.
(2) D has a fibrant replacement functor.
(3) D has a functorial path objects for fibrant objects.
Then there is a model structure on D in which a map is a fibration (weak equiva-
lence) if and only if its image under G is a fibration (weak equivalence) in C.
From this we are able to obtain the following:
Theorem 5.8. The definition of fibration and weak equivalence in MLCx1 given
above determines a model structure on MLCx1.
Proof. By Theorem 5.7, Lemma 5.6 and the fact that every object inGpd is fibrant
(and hence that every object ofMLCx1 is fibrant by definition), it suffices to prove
that the left-adjoint K : Gpd → MLCx1 of Π1 preserves small objects. Note
that both forgetful functors MLCx1 → rGSet and Gpd → rGSet preserve and
reflect filtered colimits, since both are finitarily monadic. Therefore, the functor
Π1 :MLCx1 → Gpd must preserve filtered colimits, and in particular colimits of
chains. This last statement is equivalent to the preservation of small objects by
K. 
5.3. The construction of the left adjoint K of Π1. In order to prove that the
adjunction K ⊣ Π1 is a Quillen equivalence it will be necessary to consider the
transfinite construction of K from [12] in more detail1. Henceforth G denotes a
fixed groupoid.
Let us set G(−1) := G and G′(−1) := G. We construct G(0) as the following
coequalizer (taken in the category of graphs):
M1FG M1G
M1γ //
M21GM1ΦG
,, µG
GG G(0)
e(−1) //
where γ is the action of G (qua groupoid) and ΦG is the canonical map induced by
the groupoid structure on M1G. Let i(−1) : G(−1) → G(0) denote the composite
e(−1) ◦ ηG(−1).
In the next stages of the construction of K we obtain G(n + 2) from G(n) and
G(n+ 1) as the following coequalizer
M21G(n)
M1G(n)µG(n) 66
M21G(n)
M1ηG(n)

1
M2
1
G(n)
// M1G(n+ 1)
M1e(n)// G(n+ 2)
e(n+1) //
1The construction can also be seen as combining the transfinite construction for coequalizers
in categories of algebras as detailed, for example, in [2] with the fact that the left adjoint to the
functor Π1 can be rendered as a coequalizer.
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and we define i(n+1) : G(n+1)→ G(n+2) to be the composite e(n+1)◦ηG(n+1).
KG is then defined as the colimit (taken in the category of reflexive globular sets)
lim
−→n
G(n) of the diagram consisting of the maps i(n). The action ν :M1KG→ KG
is the canonical map induced by the maps M1G(n) → G(n + 1) → KG together
with the fact that M1 is finitary and hence preserves the colimit of the chain G(i).
5.4. The Quillen equivalence. We now begin working towards the proof that
the adjunction K ⊣ Π1 is a Quillen equivalence. This will be done in several steps:
first, with the aid of the groupoid semantics we construct a sequence of functors
[[−]]n : M1G(n) → G with suitable properties. Next, we construct, by induction
on n, a realizability model of T1[G(n)] which, using Theorem 4.5, gives a natural
transformation fitting in the square
M1G(n)
e(n) //
σ(n)

G(n+ 1)

G
η
// KG
The existence of these natural isomorphisms will then be sufficient to conclude that
the unit η : G→ KG is a weak equivalence.
Before going on to the construction we first recall some basic facts about the kinds
of models of type theory considered in this paper (the Hofmann-Streicher style
groupoid models and the combinatorial realizability models described in Section
4.3). These models are genuine denotational models in the sense that each term,
type and judgement is assigned a canonical interpretation (as opposed to many
realizability models where a given judgement may have many different realizers).
A consequence of this fact, and of the interpretation of substitution in these models,
is that the interpretation is compositional in the sense that if we are given an open
judgement x : A ⊢ J and a term a : A, then the interpretation of J [a/x] is
completely determined by the interpretations of x : A ⊢ J and a : A. In particular,
in order to prove that J [a/x] and J [b/x] receive the same interpretation it suffices
to show that a and b receive the same interpretation. E.g., in the Hofmann-Streicher
style groupoid models [[b(a)]] is canonically determined as the canonical section
induced by [[b(x)]] and [[a]] (cf. the discussion in Section 4.3 following the proof of
Theorem 4.4). Explicitly, if Γ, x : A ⊢ b(x) : B(x) and Γ ⊢ a : A, then we have a
pullback diagram
[[Γ, z : B(a)]] [[Γ, x : A, z : B(x)]]//
[[Γ]]

[[Γ, x : A]]
[[Γ ⊢ a:A]]
//

and a section [[Γ, x : A ⊢ b(x) : B(x)]] of the projection [[Γ, x : A, z : B(x)]] →
[[Γ, x : A]]. This induces a canonical section [[a]]∗([[b(x)]]) of the projection [[Γ, z :
B(a)]]→ [[Γ]] which we define to be the interpretation of Γ ⊢ b(a) : B(a).
Similar remarks apply to the combinatorial realizability models. We will make
use of this compositionality of the interpretations at several places below.
We begin by constructing by induction a sequence of functors
[[−]]n :M1G(n)→ G
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as well as a sequence of graph homomorphisms α(n) : G(n)→ G such that
M1G(n)
e(n) //
[[−]]n
&&▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼▼
▼
G(n+ 1)
α(n+1)

G
is commutative.
For n = −1, we set α(−1) : G(−1) = G → G to be the identity. Note that
in order to specify the functor [[−]]n it suffices to specify a graph homomorphism
G(n) → G and then to use the Hofmann-Streicher semantics to extend this to
M1Gn. (Whence the notation overloading.) Thus at each stage, we may let [[−]]n
be the the functor induced by α(n). It remains to be shown then that it coequalizes
the relevant maps so that it factors through the coequalizer e(n) resulting in the
desired α(n+ 1) as in the above diagram.
We begin with the base case, where we have to show that [[−]]−1 : M1G → G
makes the diagram
M1FG M1G
M1γ //
M21GM1ΦG
,, µG
GG G
[[−]]−1 //
commute. Consider an object of M1FG, regarded as a term ϕ(pg ⋆ fq), where ⋆
denotes the formal composition in the free groupoid. Here, we assume that ϕ(x) is
skeletal and that g, f are basic edges in G. (Technically we must consider arbitrary
strings of formal composites in the free groupoid and a skeletal term ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
but the reasoning in that case is identical to the reasoning given here.) On the
one hand, M1γ sends this term to ϕ(pg ◦ fq) (where g ◦ f is the composite in G
using the groupoid structure γ), while on the other hand µG.M1ΦG sends it to
ϕ(pgq · pfq) (where · is the formal composition in M1(G)). Thus to prove that the
two composites are equal, we must show that
[[ϕ(pg ◦ fq)]]−1 = [[ϕ(pgq · pfq)]]−1
By compositionality of the interpretation it suffices to show that [[pg ◦ fq]]−1 =
[[pgq · pfq]]−1, which holds by functoriality of the interpretation.
Next, assume that we have defined [[−]]n and α(n+1). We must then show that
[[−]]n+1, obtained by interpreting M1G(n+ 1) in G, makes the diagram
M21G(n)
M1G(n)µG(n) 66
M21G(n)
M1ηG(n)

1
M21G(n)
// M1G(n+ 1)
M1e(n) // G
[[−]]n+1 // (16)
commute. To this end, we first establish the following useful lemma.
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Lemma 5.9. The morphisms α(n+1) and the interpretations [[−]]n+1, [[−]]−1 form
a commutative diagram
M1G(n+ 1)
M1α(n+1) //
[[−]]n+1
))❘❘
❘❘❘
❘❘❘
❘❘❘
❘❘❘
❘
M1G
[[−]]−1

G.
(17)
Proof. By compositionality, it suffices to verify that the diagram commutes when
we precompose with the unit η : G(n+ 1)→ M1G(n + 1). But then by naturality
of the unit and the definition of [[−]]n+1 we get
[[−]]n+1 ◦ η = α(n+ 1) = [[−]]−1 ◦ η ◦ α(n+ 1) = [[−]]−1 ◦M1(α(n + 1)) ◦ η
as required. 
Now consider the diagram
M1G(n)
[[−]]n ##❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
M1ηG(n)

M1α(n) // M1G
[[−]]−1
yysss
ss
ss
ss
ss
G
M21G(n) M1e(n)
// M1G(n+ 1)
M1α(n+1)
OO
[[−]]n+1
ee❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑❑
The outer diagram commutes because by IH we have
α(n+ 1) ◦ e(n) ◦ η = α(n).
The two triangles commute by the argument given above. Therefore, to show
that (16) commutes, it suffices (again by compositionality) to show that for a term
psq, where s an element of G(n), we have [[µpsq]]n = [[M1e(n)psq]]n+1. But that
is immediate from µpsq = s and the IH. This completes the proof that we have a
well-defined sequence of functors [[−]]n :M1G(n)→ G.
Theorem 5.10. The adjunction K ⊣ Π1 is a Quillen equivalence.
Proof. It suffices to show that ηG is essentially surjective on objects and full. Denote
the composite M1G(n) → G(n + 1) → G by ǫ(n), and note that this is actually a
functor. We may then consider, for each n, the (non-commutative) square
M1G(n)
e(n) //
[[−]]n

G(n+ 1)

G
η
// KG.
According to Theorem 4.5, we may specify a natural transformation in this square
by giving the components at the basic terms ofM1G(n) and verifying that these are
natural. We will do this first for n = −1. Then a basic term of M1G is simply an
element of G, and we take the component of the natural transformation to be the
identity at that element. This gives the natural transformation τ(−1) : η[[−]]−1 ⇒
ǫ(−1).
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In the inductive step, we assume we have constructed τ(n) : η[[−]]n ⇒ ǫ(n), and
we wish to define τ(n + 1). Again by Theorem 4.5, we only have to specify the
components at basic terms. Given such basic term p[t]q, where t is an element of
M1G(n), we take this component to be τ(n)t. Naturality is then inherited from
τ(n), and it also is immediate that this is independent of the choice of representative
of [t] because diagram (17) commutes.
To see that ηG is essentially surjective on objects, let [t] in KG be given. So, t
is in some G(n) and by the construction of the natural transformations above we
get a component τ(n) : [t] → η[[−]]n(t), where the latter is in the image of ηG, as
required. Similarly, given an arrow [g] : η(a)→ η(b) in KG we it follows that g is in
some G(n). Because the components of η(a) and η(b) of the natural transformation
τ(n) are identities, the naturality square at g of τ(n) then simply exhibits g as
equal to a map in the image of ηG. 
Appendix A. Rules of type theory
In this appendix we describe the syntax of the system Tω . All rules below are
stated in an ambient context which is omitted for ease of presentation.
A.1. Structural rules.
Γ ⊢ J
Weakening
∆,Γ ⊢ J
where J ranges over judgements and we assume without loss of generality that the
variables declared in ∆ and Γ are disjoint.
a : A x : A,∆ ⊢ B(x) : type
Type substitution
∆[a/x] ⊢ B(a) : type
a : A x : A,∆ ⊢ b(x) : B(x)
Term substitution
∆[a/x] ⊢ b(a) : B(a)
A : type
Variable declaration
x : A,∆ ⊢ x : A
A.2. Rules governing definitional equality.
A : type
A = A : type
A = B : type
B = A : type
A = B : type B = C : type
A = C : type
a : A
a = a : A
a = b : A
b = a : A
a = b : A b = c : A
a = c : A
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a = b : A x : A ⊢ B(x) : type
B(a) = B(b) : type
a = b : A x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x)
f(a) = f(b) : B(a)
A = B : type a : A
a : B
A.3. Formation rules.
x : A ⊢ B(x) : type ∏
formation∏
x:AB(x) : type
x : A ⊢ B(x) : type ∑
formation∑
x:AB(x) : type
a, b : A
Id formation
⊢ A(a, b) : type
N formation
⊢ N : type
A.4. Introduction and elimination rules for dependent products.
x : A ⊢ f(x) : B(x) ∏
introduction
λx:Af(x) :
∏
x:AB(x)
f :
∏
x:AB(x) a : A ∏ elimination
app(f, a) : B(a).
A.5. Introduction and elimination rules for dependent sums.
a : A b : B(a) ∑
introduction
pair(a, b) :
∑
x:AB(x)
⊢ p :
∑
x:AB(x) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ ψ(x, y) : C
(
pair(x, y)
) ∑
elimination
R
(
[x : A, y : B(x)]ψ(x, y), p
)
: C(p)
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A.6. Introduction and elimination rules for identity types.
a : A
Id introduction
r(a) : A(a, a)
x : A, y : A, z : A(x, y) ⊢ B(x, y, z) : type
x : A ⊢ ϕ(x) : B
(
x, x, r(x)
)
f : A(a, b)
Id elimination
J[x, y : A, z : A(x, y)]B(x, y, z)
(
[x : A]ϕ(x), a, b, f) : B(a, b, f)
A.7. Introduction and elimination rules for natural numbers.
N introduction (i)
0 : N
n : N
N introduction (ii)
S(n) : N
n : N c : C(0) x : N, y : C(x) ⊢ γ(x, y) : C
(
S(x)
)
N elimination
rec
(
n, c, [x : N, y : C(x)]γ(x, y)
)
: C(n)
A.8. Conversion rules.
λx:Af(x) :
∏
x:AB(x) a : A ∏ conversion
app
(
λx:Af(x), a
)
= f(a) : B(a)
a : A b : B(a) x : A, y : B(x) ⊢ ψ(x, y) : C
(
pair(x, y)
) ∑
conversion
R
(
[x : A, y : B(x)]ψ(x, y), pair(a, b)
)
= ψ(a, b) : C
(
pair(a, b)
)
a : A
Id conversion
J[x, y : A, z : A(x, y)]B(x, y, z)
(
[x : A]ϕ(x), a, a, r(a)
)
= ϕ(a) : B
(
a, a, r(a)
)
N conversion (i)
rec
(
0, c, [x : N, y : C(x)]γ(x, y)
)
= c : C(0)
n : N
N conversion (ii)
rec
(
S(n), c, [x : N, y : C(x)]γ(x, y)
)
= γ
(
n, rec
(
c, [x : N, y : C(x)]γ(x, y), n
))
: C
(
S(n)
)
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